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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-08-5817
Plaintiff,
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR

VS.

RECONSIDERATION

BONNEVILLE BILLING AND COLLECTIONS,
INC, a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

I.

INTRODUCTION.
This action arises out of Medical Recovery Services, LLC's (hereinafter "MRS") collection

on a judgment it obtained against Stacie Christ. MRS has filed suit claiming that Bonneville
Billing and Collections, Inc. (hereinafter "BB&C'') has been unjustly enriched through its
conversion of property belonging to MRS. Because this court has yet to rule on the precise
issue of unjust enrichment, MRS files this motion for reconsideration.
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II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
On April 23, 2008, MRS filed a complaint against Stacie Christ in case number CV-08-

2399.

1

On June 4, 2008, MRS obtained a judgment in case number CV-08-2399 against Stacie
Christ for the amount of $1,868.15. 2
On June 12, 2008, MRS obtained an order for continuing garnishment against Stacie
Christ's employer, Western States Equipment Company, hereinafter ("WSEC"). 3
On June 18, 2008, MRS, through the Bonneville County Sheriff, served a Writ of
Execution and Notice of Continuing Garnishment on Stacie Christ's employer, WSEC.

4

On June 23, 2008, WSEC returned the Acknowledgement of Receipt of Garnishment to
the Bonneville County Sheriff. 5
On July 10, 2008, WSEC inadvertently sent Check No. 0708908235 in the amount of
$331.00 to Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. (hereinafter "BB&C'') rather than to the
Bonneville County Sheriff. The mistake was the result of Bonneville Billing and Collections being
sequentially next to Bonneville County Sheriff on a pull-down computer menu. 6

1

See Complaint attached to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009 as Exhibit "A".
See Default Judgment attached to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009 as Exhibit "B".
3
See Order for Continuing Garnishment attached to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009 as
Exhibit "C".
4
See Notice of Continuing Garnishment attached to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009 as
Exhibit "D".
5
See Acknowledgement of Receipt of Garnishment attached to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19,
2009 as Exhibit "E".
6
See pp. 14, 16-17, 29, 37 of the transcript of the Deposition of Clayne Bodily taken December 12, 2008, attached
as Exhibit "F" to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009; Responses to Plaintiff's First Request for
Admissions to Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. dated November 6, 2008 attached to the Affidavit of Bryan N.
Zollinger dated March 19, 2009 as Exhibit "G"; see specifically Response to Request No. 6.
2
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On July 24, 2008, WSEC inadvertently sent Check No. 0708971963 in the amount of
$394.84 to BB&C rather than to the Bonneville County Sheriff. The mistake was the result of
Bonneville Billing and Collections being sequentially next to Bonneville County Sheriff on a pulldown computer menu.

7

On August 7, 2008, WSEC inadvertently sent Check No. 0808036464 in the amount of
$357.38 to BB&C rather than to the Bonneville County Sheriff. The mistake was the result of
Bonneville Billing and Collections being sequentially next to Bonneville County Sheriff on a pulldown computer menu.

8

On August 20, 2008, Bonneville County Sheriff Deputy, Sherrie Berggren, informed MRS,
via letter, that Alice Hannaford, the payroll administrator for WSEC, had informed her that
WSEC had mistakenly sent the checks to BB&C rather than the Bonneville County Sheriff and
that Alice Hannaford had spoken to Clayne Bodily, the office manager of BB&C, and explained
the error and that Mr. Bodily refused to return the money to WSEC.

9

On August 21, 2008, MRS sent a demand letter to BB&C explaining the situation and
demanding that it return the $1,083.21 to WSEC within 10 days.

10

7

See pp. 14,16-17, 29, 37 of the transcript of the Deposition of Clayne Bodily taken December 12, 2008, attached
as Exhibit "F" to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009; Responses to Plaintiff's First Request for
Admissions to Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. dated November 6, 2008 attached to the Affidavit of Bryan N.
Zollinger dated March 19, 2009 as Exhibit "G"; see specifically Response to Request No. 6.
8
See pp. 14, 16-17, 29, 37 of the transcript of the Deposition of Clayne Bodily taken December 12, 2008, attached
as Exhibit "F" to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009; Responses to Plaintiff's First Request for
Admissions to Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. dated November 6, 2008 attached to the Affidavit of Bryan N.
Zollinger dated March 19, 2009 as Exhibit "G"; see specifically Response to Request No. 6.
9
See Letter from Bonneville County Sheriff dated August 20, 2008, attached as Exhibit "H" to the Affidavit of Bryan
N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009.
10
See Demand letter sent to Bonneville Billing and Collections dated August 21, 2008, attached as Exhibit "I" to the
Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009; See pp. 38-39 of the transcript of the Deposition of Clayne
Bodily taken December 12, 2008, attached as Exhibit "F" to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19,
2009.
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On August 28, 2008, BB&C sent a response letter to MRS stating that it had received the
above described checks but that it would not return the $1,083.21 to WSEC.

11

On September 18, 2008, MRS filed a complaint in the current action in Bonneville
County for conversion.

12

On November 6, 2008, BB&C admitted that before the filing ofthis lawsuit, it had
knowledge that the checks from Western States Equipment Company were sent to it by
mistake.
Ill.

13

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURE.
On September 19, 2008, MRS filed a complaint alleging that BB&C had converted

property belonging to MRS and that BB&C had been unjustly enriched at the expense of MRS.
On June 4, 2009, the court issued its order on MRS' motion for summary judgment. The
court found that WSEC mistakenly sent BB&C $1,083.21. The court ruled that BB&C received
the money in "good faith." Therefore, BB&C was not liable to MRS for conversion or unjust
enrichment.
On June 11, 2009, the court entered judgment in favor of BB&C.
On July 20, 2009, MRS filed a notice of appeal to the district court.
On December 11, 2009, the district court dismissed the appeal because the judgment
the magistrate court entered was not final. The judgment was not final because MRS had a

11

See Response letter from Bonneville Billing and Collections dated August 28, 2008, attached as Exhibit "J" to the
Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009.
12
See Complaint.
13

Responses to Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions to Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. dated November 6,
2008 attached to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger dated March 19, 2009 as Exhibit "G"; see specifically Response
to Request No. 6.
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remaining cause of action for constructive trust that the court had not ruled on. Thus, less than
all of the claims had been adjudicated thereby making the judgment not "final."
On April 8, 2010, MRS filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that on appeal MRS
had discovered the existence of Idaho Code Section 18-2403(c). This code section criminalizes
keeping mistakenly delivered property known to belong to another without returning the
property to the owner. MRS contended that BB&C's conduct fell squarely within this code
section thus making BB&C's conduct a felony. MRS further contended that BB&C had to be
unjustly enriched because it had to commit a felony to keep the money.
On June 29, 2010, the court denied MRS' motion for reconsideration. The court denied
the motion relying on State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322 (Ct. App. 2008). This case involved
dissimilar facts in which the defendant took her dog from an animal shelter to avoid paying
shelter fees. Importantly, this case does not even involve misdelivery of the property of
another. This court relied on Culbreth to summarily conclude without any explanation that
MRS' motion should be denied.
On November 17, 2010, this court entered judgment against MRS in the amount of
$10,658.00 that included an award of attorney's fees and costs to BB&C.
On 12/1/2010, MRS filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following grounds:
1.

This court has never addressed the issue of whether MRS had any type of
property interest in the $1,083.21 that it garnished;

2.

This court has never addressed the issue that BB&C could not possibly have
acted in good faith and keep the money once BB&C learned that it had received
the money by mistake;

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 5
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3.

This court has never applied or distinguished Idaho Code Section 18-2403(c);
instead, this court relied on a case that does not even involve the mistaken
delivery of property nor does the case even address the relevant subpart (c) of
Section 18-2403; and

4.

This court has never addressed how BB&C was not unjustly enriched at the
expense of MRS when MRS filed the complaint against Mr. Christ, obtained a
judgment, garnished Mr. Christ's wages, and would have received the
garnishment money but for a mistake in delivery to BB&C, while BB&C did not
have to do anything (except be the fortunate recipient of a mistaken delivery) to
get the money.

IV.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Under l.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), a motion for reconsideration can be made at any time within

14 days after entry of judgment. Here, Judgment was entered on November 17, 2010. This
means that MRS had until December 1, 2010 to file its motion for reconsideration. Given that
MRS filed its motion for reconsideration on December 1, 2010, the motion is timely.
V.

MRS HAS PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GARNISHED FUNDS SUPERIOR TO BB&C, AND BB&C
CONVERTED THESE SUPERIOR PROPERTY RIGHTS.
Idaho Code permits a judgment creditor to attach and garnish the wages of a judgment

debtor and provides the procedure for garnishing those wages. l.C. §§ 8-507 et. seq. Idaho
courts have held that by complying with these statutory procedures a judgment creditor
obtains a lien upon the attached property by virtue of garnishment proceedings. Federal

Reserve Bank of San Francisco v. Smith, 42 Idaho 224 (1926). Courts have described a
garnishment as "the process by which the garnishee is brought into court, and also that by
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 6

~

F:\CLIENTS\BDS\8006\Pleadings\0032 Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration.doc

J...V'-"'

r-~ ~

which the defendant's credit or property is attached in the garnishee's hands. Its service is
constructive seizure by notice. It is attachment in the hands of a third person." In re
Aughenbaugh, 2002 WL 33939738 (Bankr.D.ldaho 2002); See also Kaesenmeyer v. Smith, 22

Idaho 1 (1912)(holding that garnishment on bank account created a lien superior to all later
equitable claims). A creditor's lien becomes "perfected as of the date of service of the
paperwork on [the garnishee] by the sheriff." In re Aughenbaugh. Additionally, property
attached and not physically in possession of the creditor is constructively in possession of the
creditor through the levying officer as his agent. Bass v. Stodd, 357 F.2d 458, 465 {9th Cir. 1966).
In this case, MRS obtained a judgment against Stacie Christ and had the Bonneville
County Sheriff serve the writ of execution on Stacie Christ's employer WSEC on June 18, 2008.
When the sheriff served the writ of execution on WSEC, MRS obtained a perfected lien on the
attached future earnings of Stacie Christ in possession of the garnishee. As of this date, MRS
had property rights in these attached future earnings superior to all other parties including
BB&C and Stacie Christ. Therefore, once these future wages were attached and payable to
Stacie Christ, MRS was constructively in possession of the property through the levying officer,
Bonneville County Sheriff, as its agent.
Conversion has been defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over
another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with rights therein." Luzat v. Western
Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 696 (1984). It is not necessary that the actor intend to commit a

trespass or conversion. See Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743 {1999).
A positive act of dominion over another's property is all that is required. Id. at 743. "An actor
may be liable where he has in fact exercised dominion or control, although he may be quite

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 7
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unaware of existence of rights with which he interferes, and a defendant's intention, good or
bad faith, and his knowledge or mistake are immaterial." Id. Further, Idaho courts have held
that a "demand by the rightful owner and a refusal by the alleged tortfeasor are necessary
elements of the tort of conversion." Id.
In this case, BB&C has admitted that it has received the three checks from WSEC.

14

BB&C has admitted that it had knowledge that these checks totaling $1,083.21 were sent to it
by mistake.

15

Further, both Alice Hannaford, payroll administrator for WSEC, and MRS

informed BB&C that the payments were intended to go to the Bonneville Sheriff who would
then forward the payments to MRS who was the rightful owner of the property. 16 MRS as the
rightful owner made a demand in writing to BB&C who then refused to return the property.

17

Thus, it is clear that BB&C has in fact wrongfully exercised dominion and control over MRS'
personal property in denial of or inconsistent with MRS' rights. WSEC and MRS notified BB&C
that WSEC had mistakenly sent the money to BB&C. These notifications put BB&C on notice
that MRS was the rightful owner of the money it had mistakenly received. After being put on
notice, BB&C refused to return the property to MRS. Thus, this court should rule as a matter of
law that BB&C has unlawfully converted MRS' personal property, which property is valued at
$1,083.21.
This court has never ruled whether MRS had any property interest in the garnished
proceeds nor has this court explained why MRS' attachment was not some property interest
14

See Fact No. 11 of plaintiffs Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed concurrently herewith.
15
See Fact Nos. 13 & 11 of plaintiffs Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed concurrently herewith.
16
See Fact Nos. 9 & 10 of plaintiffs Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed concurrently herewith.
17
See Fact No. 10 of plaintiffs Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed concurrently herewith.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 8
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that BB&C could convert. This court has simply ruled that BB&C did not know about the
misdelivery at the time it received the money and therefore acted in good faith. Even so, there
is no dispute that BB&C subsequently learned about the misdelivery when counsel for MRS
demanded return of the money and still exercised dominion and control over the money. This
court has never explained why this is not conversion.
VI.

BB&C HAS BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AT THE EXPENSE OF MRS.
Idaho courts have held that "unjust enrichment occurs where a defendant receives a

benefit which would be inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent
that retention is unjust." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547 {2007). In Idaho a
plaintiff must establish three elements to establish a prima facie case for unjust enrichment. A
plaintiff must show that (1) a benefit is conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) the
defendant appreciates the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for the defendant to accept
the benefit without payment of the value of the benefit. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v.
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88 (1999).
Here, MRS has spent time and money (attorney's fees, filing fees, service fees, and
sheriff's fees) in obtaining and collecting on a judgment. Specifically, MRS has spent time and
resources to prepare a complaint and summons, obtain a judgment, obtain a writ of execution,
had all of these documents served upon the interested parties, and recovered $1,083.21. There
is no question that, but for the misdelivery, MRS would have received the $1,083.21. BB&C has
admitted that it received the checks, deposited the checks, and has refused to return the

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 9
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$1,083.21.

18

Thus, BB&C has admittedly appreciated the benefit of MRS' time and costs in the

amount of at least $1,083.21. It would be inequitable for BB&C to accept the benefit of MRS'
labors and costs in the amount of $1,083.21 without paying MRS for the value of the benefit.
Again, this court has never addresses or explained why BB&C's actions do not amount to
unjust enrichment. This court simply ruled against MRS without any explanation. MRS submits
that this court needs to provide an analysis so that MRS can evaluate its position with respect
to pursuing an appeal.
VII.

BB&C'S VIOLATION OF IDAHO CODE SECTION 18-2403 COMPELS THE CONCLUSION THAT
BB&C HAS BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED.
In relevant part, Idaho Code Section 18-2403 states:
(1) A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of
property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully
takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.
(2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's property,
with the intent prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, committed in any of the
following ways:

(a) By deception obtains or exerts control over property of the owner;
(b) By conduct heretofore defined or know as larceny; common law larceny by trick;
embezzlement; extortion; obtaining property, money or labor under false presentences;
or receiving stolen goods;
(c) By acquiring lost property. A person acquires Jost property when he exercises
control over property of another which he knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to
have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or the nature or
amount of the property, without taking reasonable measures to return such property to
the owner; or a person commits theft of lost or mislaid property when he:
1. Knows or learns the identity of the owner or knows, or is aware of, or learns
of a reasonable method of identifying the owner; and
2. Fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to the owner; and
3. Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the
property.
Idaho Code§ 18-2403 (emphasis added.)

18

See Fact No. 11 of plaintiffs Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed concurrently herewith.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 10
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Idaho Code§ 18-2402(6) defines owner as "any person who has a right to possession thereof
superior to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder." Idaho Code §§ 18-2407 and 18-2408
make theft of property with a value in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000) felony grand
theft. In discussing 18-2403, one Idaho court has explained the following:
It is well established at common law that one who finds and appropriates lost
property acquires a complete right thereto against all the world except the true owner.
Morgan and Bros. Manhattan Storage Co. v. McGuire, 114 Misc.2d 951, 452 N.Y.S.2d
986 (1982); Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211, 221 (Del.1980); Paset v. Old Orchard
Bank & Trust Co., 62 lll.App.3d 534, 19 Ill.Dec. 389, 378 N.E.2d 1264 (1978). See also 36A
C.J.S. Finding Lost Goods§ 5 (1961); 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed
Property, § 19 (1962). In general, the character of the thing found does not affect the
property rights of the finder. However, should the finder know or have reasonable
means of discovering the true owner, he must do so or he may be guilty of larceny.
See, e.g., 1 Am.Jur. Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, § 28.

***
Idaho criminal law embodies this principle, providing that a person may be held
criminally liable for theft "when he exercises control over property of another which he
knows to have been lost or mislaid ... without taking reasonable measures to return the
property to the owner." l.C. § 18-2403{2)(c). (Emphasis added).

State v. Evans, 119 Idaho 383, 386 (Ct. App. 1991.)
Idaho Code makes the obtaining and withholding of another's property, with a value in
excess of a thousand dollars, grand theft when the property has "been delivered _under a
mistake as to the identity of the recipient" and the party thereafter "learns the identity of the
owner." Idaho Code § 18-2403 is nearly identical to theft provisions of several other states,
which have held that parties who received funds as a result of mistaken delivery are guilty of
theft. See Cora v. State, 2009 WL 1471732 (Ark. App. 2009).
In Cora, a finance company mistakenly sent a payment to a boat dealer in behalf of a
purchaser who had already obtained other financing and used that other financing to pay for
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION -11
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the boat. The boat dealer did not know of the overpayment and used the mistakenly sent
funds to pay expenses learning only later that it had received the mistaken payment. When the
boat dealer was unable to repay the amount it had mistakenly received, the boat dealer was
charged and convicted of theft under a statute nearly identical to Idaho Code§ 18-2403(c).
Here, the same result follows. Stacie Christ's employer mistakenly sent the garnishment
checks to "Bonneville Billing and Collections" instead of "Bonneville County Sheriff." MRS is an
"owner" because MRS' rights to the mistakenly delivered money are superior to BB&C who is
just the mere possessor of the mistakenly delivered funds. See Idaho Code § 18-2402(6) (which
defines owner as "any person who has a right to possession thereof superior to that of the
taker, obtainer or withholder"). As soon as BB&C learned the identity of MRS as the owner of
the funds, exercised dominion and control over the funds, and refused to return the funds,
BB&C committed felony grand theft under Idaho Code§ 18-2403. This wrongful act amounts to
grand theft under Idaho law. See Idaho Code§§ 18-2407 and 18-2408. Even if the Bonneville
County Sheriff or WSEC were the true owner and not MRS, MRS submits that conduct
amounting to grand theft against the Bonneville County Sheriff, WSEC or MRS necessarily
makes that conduct at least unjust enrichment if not conversion.
This court has ignored the plain language of Section 18-2403(c). Instead, this court has
relied on State v. Culbreth, supra, 146 Idaho at 322 for the proposition that BB&C would have to
employ "deception, trick, extortion, false pretenses or false promise" for Section 18-2403 to
apply. However, the court in Culbreth applied its analysis to subparts (a), (b) and (d) of Section
18-2403. The court's discussion in Culbreth never addressed subpart (c) of Section 18-2403.
This is important because MRS claims that subpart (c) of Section 18-2403 is the subsection that
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applies here because this subpart addresses BB&C's exercising control over property which it
knew to have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient. In other
words, there are multiple subparts to Section 18-2403. This court has never addressed the
applicability of Section 18-2403(c) to the facts of this case.
VIII.

CONCLUSION.
For all the reasons set forth above, Medical Recovery Services, respectfully requests that

the court grant its motion for reconsideration.
DATEo this /

-sr,bday of January 2011.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

Bryan N. Z linger, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICAT~F SERVICE

~~~nuary,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /
2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATOIN to be served, by
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the
following:
Persons Served:
Todd R. Erikson, P.A.
3456 East lih Street, Suite 280
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

()Hand

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION -13
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\8006\Pleadings\0032 Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration.doc

(~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTNfi:f

Rf AM

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
Vs.
)
)
BONNEVILLE BILLING &
)
COLLECTIONS, INC
)
)
Defendant.
)

CASE NO: CV 08-5817
Order on Reconsideration

_______________ )

This case stems from a collection action originally brought by Medical Recovery
Services, LLC (hereinafter "MRS") against Stacie Christ wherein, in that case,
Bonneville County Case Number CV-08-2399, MRS obtained a judgment against Ms.
Christ in the sum of $1,877.23. MRS sought to collect the judgment through the
Bonneville County Sheriff serving a Notice of Continuing Garnishment and a Writ of
Execution on Christ's employer Western States Equipment Company (hereinafter
"WSEC"). WSEC identified and withheld some wages of Christ and sent them not to the
Sheriff pursuant to the Writ of Execution but sent to Bonneville Billing and Collections,
Inc. (hereinafter "BBC"), by mistake, three checks in the total sum of $1,083 .21.
As it turned out BBC also had claims against Christ for which lawsuits had been
filed. BBC applied the funds from WSEC to debts owed to BBC and dismissed one of
the lawsuits it had against Christ before learning that the monies had been forwarded by
WSEC by mistake. MRS has sued BBC herein seeking a judgment for the $1,083.21 and
costs and attorney fees.
The court has been asked to reconsider the following orders from this case:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

June 4, 2009 Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment;
June 29, 2010 Order on Motion/or Reconsideration;
August 24, 2010 Order Granting Defendants Motion/or Summary Judgment;
November 17, 2010 Order on Settlement ofAttorney Fees and Costs;
November 17, 2010Judgment.

The theories upon which relief has been sought are stated in the Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial as conversion, constructive trust and unjust enrichment. The
Motion on which the June 29, 2010 Order on Motion for Reconsideration was based
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upped the ante considerably when an additional theory of criminal conversion of
property was introduced, on which theory MRS also seeks to obtain relief.
The original judge in this case has retired and so the reconsideration is being
conducted by the undersigned. This court has made a full review of the file. Since this
reconsideration is being conducted by a new judge Plaintiff is being given another "bite
at the apple'', so to speak, but this bite, for the following reasons provides no additional
satisfaction to the Plaintiff and will be as unsatisfying as the previous bites.
The essential facts are stated in the Separate Statement of Undisputed facts in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed herein on March 9, 2009 and Defendants
Brief RE: Summary Judgment filed April 29, 2009. It is not necessary to recite herein all
the facts as stated in those two documents, but this decision has been made with reference
to those fact statements.
On June 18, 2008 the Bonneville County Sheriff served a Writ of Execution and
Notice of Continuing Garnishment on Christ's employer WSEC. On June 23, WSEC
returned the Acknowledgment of Receipt of Garnishment to the Bonneville County
Sheriff. Money was withheld by WSEC as a result of the garnishment, in the amounts of
July 10, 2008, $331.00, July 24, 2008 $394.83, and August 7, 2008, $357.38, but
mistakenly forwarded to BBC. Prior to receiving the checks, BBC was unaware that
WSEC was Christ's employer but believed the payments were from a voluntary wage
assignment by Christ. BBC applied the proffered funds to debts it was collecting and
suits which it had pending against Christ , even dismissing one lawsuit BBC had against
Christ. The amounts received by BBC from WSEC were not enough to satisfy what was
owed to BBC.

In the case of In Re David & Laura Aughenbaugh, Debtors, 2002 WL 33939738
(Bkrtcy .D .Idaho), the bankruptcy court interpreted Idaho's garnishment statutes to
determine whether wages, the subject of a garnishment notice served by the sheriff to
debtors employer, remained the property of debtor, and thus subject to the automatic
bankruptcy stay or whether, by virtue of the garnishment notice, were the property of the
creditor or the sheriff and thus were no longer the property of the debtor and could be
paid out to the creditor even after the filing of the bankruptcy. In that case monies,
subject to the sheriff's garnishment notice, were held by the employer but before they
were forwarded to the sheriff the debtors filed bankruptcy. In the case the court stated:
"In re Ducommun, 159 B.R. 919, 920, 93 I.B.C.R. 242, 243
(Bankr.D.Idaho
1993), explained:

A garnishment is "the process by which the garnishee is brought into
court, and also that by which the defendant's credit or property is
attached in the garnishee's hands. Its service is constructive seizure by
notice. It is attachment in the hands of a third person." Eagleson v. Rubin,
16 Idaho 92, 100 P. 765, 767 (1909) (quoting Waples, Attachment and
Garnishment § 469). Inland is correct in its assertion that service of the
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writ of garnishment created a lien on the property held in the hands of the
garnishee-here the Sheriff's Department. "By the service in the manner
provided by statute, whether it be termed 'garnishment' or 'service of the
attachment/ while the possession is not necessarily disturbed, 'a lien is
obtained on defendant's title to the property in the hands of the
garnishee."' Sullivan v. Mabey, 45 Idaho 595, 264 P. 233, 236 (1928)
(quoting Kimball v. Richardson-Kimball Co., 111 Cal. 386, 43 P. 1111
(1896)). "The plaintiff in the attachment action obtained a lien upon the
pledged property in the hands of the pledgee bank by virtue of the
garnishment proceedings. Fed. Res. Bank of San Francisco v. Smith, 42
Idaho 224, 244 P. 1102, 1103 (1926). See also Trustee, Ltd. v. BowenHall, Inc. (In re Pro-Ida Foods, Inc.}, 88 I.B.C.R. 219, 221-22
(Bankr.D.Idaho 1988) (noting that garnishment creates a lien for the
purpose of an avoidable preference action under 11 U.S.C. § 547).
1

'

A similar discussion is found in Fitzgerald v. Campbell (In re Greene), 92
I.B.C.R. 212 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1992). Greene addressed a continuing
garnishment in the context of a preference action. The Court stated:
Service of the execution and Order did not irrevocably transfer all Debtors'
rights in future proceeds to Defendants. Under Idaho's statutes, service of
a garnishment on a party owing money to the judgment debtor simply
creates a new liability in the third party to the judgment creditor until the
judgment is satisfied. Idaho Code § 8-508. No Idaho court cases support
this proposition but this Court has held that "[s]ervice of a garnishment in
Idaho appears to create a lien upon property in the hands of the garnishee
that is the subject of the garnishment .... 11 Trustee, Ltd. vs. Bowen-Hall,
Inc., 88 I.B.C.R. 219, 221; see also Delamere vs. Boyd, 82 LB .C.R. 203,
204. At best, then, as to Debtor's future proceeds, Defendants held a lien
on those proceeds which was perfected as of the date of service of the
paperwork on [the garnishee] by the sheriff. Delamere, 82 I.B.C.R. at
204."

The court adopts this language and finds in the instant case that the service of the
garnishment documents by the Bonneville County Sheriff to WSEC did not create an
ownership of the property in MRS, but a lien only. The funds sent to BBC from WSEC
did not belong to, nor were they the property of Plaintiff, nor the Bonneville County
Sheriff.
In the case of Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P.3d 1036 (S.Ct. 2008) the
Idaho Supreme Court stated, "Under Idaho law, a lien is a charge upon property to secure
payment of a debt and transfers no title to the property subject to the lien. I. C. § 45-109;
LC.§ 45-101."
Since the monies forwarded to BBC did not belong to Plaintiff nor to the Sheriff,
they remained the property of Christ or of WSEC and were forwarded to BBC. At no
time was MRS the owner of the property.
For plaintiff to recover on any of its theories against this defendant, MRS would
have to be considered the owner of the property (the $1,083.21).
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See Peasley Transfer and Storage v. Smith 132 Idaho 732 (1999) as to conversion "A
right of action (of conversion) accrues in favor of the owner of the property ... "
See Erb v. Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328 (Id.App. 1992) as to constructive trust," ... so that he
cannot equitably retain the property which really belongs to another ... " .
See Vander(Ord Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547 (2007) as to unjust enrichment "A
prima facia case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements (1) There was a benefit
conferred upon the defendant .Qy the plaintiff. .. " (emphasis added). In the instant case,
Plaintiff conferred no benefit on Defendant because Plaintiff had no benefit to confer.
See Idaho Code 18-2403 (1) as to criminal conversion, "A person steals property and
commits theft when ... he wrongfully takes ... property from an owner thereof."
Since MRS was not the owner of the $1,083.21 MRS cannot prevail against this
defendant in this case.
The court has also carefully reviewed the record as it pertains to the November
17, 2010 Order on Settlement ofAttorney Fees and Costs and the November 17, 2010
Judgment and finds no error in the award of attorney fees and costs as set forth in those
documents.
Therefore, there are no genuine issues of fact and Defendant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed and Plaintiff shall take
nothing thereby. All the previous orders herein as stated above
/ are affirmed and are
hereby the Order of the Court.
Dated this ~ay of February 2011.

~~
Ste en A. Gardner
Magistrate Judge

~
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RULE 54 (b) Certificate
This case has been fully resolved by this order and with respect to the issues
determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with
IRCP 54(b) that the court has determined that there is no just reason for the delay of the
final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment or
order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may i ue and an appeal may be
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
Dated this

/t t-1-day of February 2011.
Steven A. Gardner
Magistrate Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 16, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to the following by mailing, with correct postage thereon, by facsimile, or by
causing the same to be hand delivered.

Plaintiffs Counsel:
Bryan D. Smith
P. 0. Box 50731
Idaho Falls ID 83405

Defendant's Counsel:
Todd R. Erikson
3456 East 17th Street, Suite 280
Idaho Falls ID 83406

0 Courthouse Box

0 US Mail

0FAX

0 Hand Delivery

0 Courthouse Box

US Mail
0 Hand Delivery

0FAX

Deputy Clerk

Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq.
Idaho State Bar# 8008
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Avenue
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
(208) 524-0731
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-08-5817
Plaintiff,
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND

vs.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

BONNEVILLE BILLING AND COLLECTIONS,
INC, a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

COMES NOW plaintiff, Medical Recovery Services, LLC, and for a claim against
defendant, alleges as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1.

The plaintiff, Medical Recovery Services, LLC ("MRS"), is, and at all times material

herein was, a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Idaho doing
business in Bonneville County, Idaho.
2.

The defendant, Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. ("BB&C''), is, and at all

times material herein was, a Utah corporation doing business in Bonneville County, Idaho.
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3.

On or about June 4, 2008, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against Stacie Christ

for the amount of $1,868.15.
4.

On or about June 18, 2008, the plaintiff through the Bonneville County sheriff

served a Writ of Execution and Notice of Continuing Garnishment on Stacie Christ's employer,
Western States Equipment Company.
5.

Between the period starting July 7, 2008 and ending August 7, 2008, Western

States Equipment Company mistakenly sent three checks intended for the plaintiff totaling
$1,083.21 to the defendant, BB&C, rather than Bonneville County Sherriff's Department.
6.

On or about August 20, 2008, the Bonneville County Sheriff informed the plaintiff

that Western States Equipment Company had inadvertently sent the payments to the
defendant and that the defendant had refused a request from Western States Equipment
Company to return the money.
7.

On or about August 21, 2008, the plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant

demanding return of the money to Western States Equipment Company who would then
forward it to the sheriff pursuant to the garnishment.
8.

On or about August 29, 2008, the plaintiff received a response letter from the

defendant admitting receipt of the payments from Western States Equipment Company and
refusing to return the money. The defendant further admitted that it mistakenly received the
money.
9.

At the time this action was commenced, the plaintiff was the owner of,

lien holder against, or otherwise entitled to the possession of the money mistakenly delivered
to the defendant who refuses to return it.
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COUNT I

(Claim and Delivery)
10.

The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 9 as though set

forth at length herein.
11.

The plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed or is entitled to the possession

thereof, having garnished the money, having attached the money, and having ownership of, a
lien against, or otherwise being in possession of the money, but for a mistake in delivery to the
defendant.
12.

The defendant wrongfully detains the money from the plaintiff having come into

possession as alleged herein.
13.

The defendant continues to maintain possession of the money for the improper

purpose of unfairly competing with the plaintiff and to exercise dominion and control over the
money for the defendant's use and enjoyment to the exclusion of the plaintiff.
14.

The property the defendant wrongfully detains is valued at $1,083.21 and is in

the possession of the defendant located at 431 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho.
15.

The property the defendant wrongfully detains and that the plaintiff seeks has

not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute or seized under an
execution against the property of the plaintiff.
16.

Accordingly, the plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at

trial and seeks a writ for return of the money that the defendant wrongfully detains.
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COUNT II

(Lien Foreclosure)
17.

The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 16 as though set

forth at length herein.
18.

By virtue of execution of the garnishment and attachment, the plaintiff has a lien

against the money that the defendant wrongfully detains.
19.

The plaintiff's lien rights are superior to the possessory interest of the

defendant.
20.

The plaintiff seeks foreclosure of its lien rights against the money the defendant

wrongfully detains.
21.

Accordingly, the plaintiff seeks an order or writ allowing the plaintiff to foreclose

on the money the defendant wrongfully detains.
COUNT Ill

(Intentional Interference With A Prospective Economic Advantage)
22.

The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 as though set

forth at length herein.
23.

The plaintiff had a valid economic expectation that it would receive the money it

garnished and attached through legal processes.
24.

The defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's economic expectation that the

plaintiff would receive the money it garnished and attached.
25.

The defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's economic expectation

thereby terminating the plaintiff's economic expectation.

-I
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26.

The defendant's interference was legally wrongful resulting in damages to the

plaintiff.
COUNT IV

(CONVERSION}
27.

The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 26 as though set

forth at length herein.
28.

The plaintiff was the legal owner of, lien holder against, and/or had the right of

possession to the money that were inadvertently sent to the defendant described as:
1. Western States Equipment check no. 0708908235 for the amount of $331.00.
2. Western States Equipment check no. 0708971963 for the amount of $394.83.
3. Western States Equipment check no. 0808036464 for the amount of $357.38.
29.

The plaintiff has an absolute and unconditional right to the money that was

inadvertently paid to the defendant.
30.

The defendant, with knowledge of the plaintiff's interest in the money, took and

unlawfully converted the money to the defendant's own use and benefit.
31.

Upon discovering that the defendant had unlawfully converted the plaintiff's

personal property, the plaintiff sent a demand letter on August 21, 2008 verifying the plaintiff's
interest and demanding return of the money.
32.

The defendant has admitted receiving the money and further has refused to

return it or to reimburse the plaintiff for the value and has refused to do so up to the time of
filing this suit.

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Pages
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\8006\Pleadings\0036 Amended Complaint.doc

33.

As a result of the defendant's wrongful conduct as alleged herein, the plaintiff is

entitled to recover from the defendant damages in the amount of $1,083.21.
34.

The defendant has taken and converted the personal property of the plaintiff

willfully and maliciously, with reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights. After demand was
made on defendant to return the property or reimburse the plaintiff for its value, defendant
willfully and maliciously, with reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights, refused to return the
property or reimburse the plaintiff. The defendant has even gone so far as to label the
plaintiff's claim to return of its money as "frivolous."
COUNTV

(Unjust Enrichment)
35.

The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 34 as though set

forth at length herein.
36.

The money the defendant received through mistake is in fact the property of the

plaintiff, property in which the plaintiff has a lien, or property to which the plaintiff is entitled
to possession.
37.

The plaintiff has performed all conditions precedent to the maintenance an action

for unjust enrichment.
38.

As a result of the defendant's receipt of property belonging to the plaintiff,

property in which the plaintiff has a lien, or property to which the plaintiff is entitled to
possession that the defendant refuses to return to the plaintiff, the defendant has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff in the amount of $1,083.21.

•j

-
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COUNT VI

(Constructive Trust)
39.

The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 38 as though set

forth at length herein.
40.

The defendant wrongfully possesses the above-described property worth

$1,083.21 belonging to the plaintiff who is the rightful owner, lienholder, or rightful! possessor.
As such, the defendant rightfully owes the plaintiff the sum of $1,083.21 for the money that the
defendant has wrongfully detained.
41.

Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to relief in the form of a constructive trust

imposed on the defendant for the sum of $1,083.21 plus costs, interest and any other sums
deemed equitable, for the benefit of the plaintiff.
COUNT VII

(Attorney's Fees)
42.

The plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 41 as though set

forth at length herein.
43.

As a direct and proximate result of defendants' wrongful conduct as herein

alleged, plaintiff has been required to retain an attorney and incur attorney's fees and costs of
suit, which plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and
12-121, and Rule 54(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and all other applicable Idaho law and
rules. In this regard, the plaintiff made demand upon the defendant for payment of damages
within the meaning of Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) and is entitled to recover attorney's fees under this

-'/ t·" ,_
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code section because the defendant failed to pay the plaintiff any amount pursuant to the
plaintiff's demand.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against defendants as follows:
1.

For judgment against the defendant for damages for the sum of $1,083.21;

2.

For judgment ordering disgorgement of plaintiff's funds unjustly retained by the

defendant in the sum of $1,083.21;
3.

For a writ to be issued ordering the Bonneville County Sheriff to attach, garnish, or

otherwise execute on the $1,083.21 that the defendant wrongfully detains;
4.

For a judgment of foreclosure allowing the plaintiff to foreclose its lien against the

$1,083.21 the defendant wrongfully detains;
5.

For the creation of a constructive trust to hold the plaintiff's money improperly

retained by defendant as a result of defendant's wrongful conduct;
6.

For judgment awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $1,000 if the

plaintiff takes judgment by default or in the amount awarded by the court if the plaintiff takes
judgment other than by default;
7.

For an order allowing the plaintiff to amend this amended complaint to allege a

claim for punitive damages;
7.

For judgment awarding costs of suit; and

8.

For such other and further relief as to the court seems just and equitable in the

premises.

- .,
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DATED this

'2. '3

~
day of February, 2011.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

By:~/~

~rdollinger, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMES NOW plaintiff, Medical Recovery Services, LLC, and makes demand for a jury trial of
the issues in the above-entitled action pursuant to Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

rA
DATED:

{3

February, 2011.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

/!:~an N. Ji°nger, Esq.
Att=s for Plaintiff
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC )
Plaintiff,
vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING &
COLLECTIONS, INC
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO: CV 08-5817
Order on Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to File an Amended
Complaint

--------------)
This case stems from a collection action originally brought by Medical Recovery
Services, LLC (hereinafter "MRS") against Stacey Christ, wherein in that case , Bonneville
County Case number CV-08-2399, MRS obtained a judgment against Ms. Christ in the sum of
$1,877.23. MRS sought to collect the judgment in that case through the Bonneville County
Sheriff serving a Notice of Continuing Garnishment and a Writ of Execution on Christ's
employer Western States Equipment Company (hereinafter "WSEC"). WSEC identified and
withheld some wages of Christ and sent them not to the Bonneville County Sheriff pursuant to
the Writ of Execution but sent to Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. (hereinafter "BBC"),
by mistake, three checks totaling $1,083 .21.
As it turned out BBC also had claims against Christ for which lawsuits had been filed.
BBC applied the $1,083.21 from WSEC to the debts owed to BBC and dismissed one of the
lawsuits it had against Christ before learning that the monies had been forwarded by WSEC by
mistake. MRS has sued BBC herein seeking a judgment for the $1,083.21 and costs and attorney
fees.
•'>
........'"°' ~)
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On June 4, 2009 the court herein denied the motion of MRS for summary judgment and
upon being asked to reconsider the decision the court again on June 29, 2010 denied the relief
requested by MRS. Thereafter BBC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, on the same facts,
which summary judgment was granted, dismissing the complaint of MRS. Judgment for
attorney fees and costs was entered in favor of BBC on November 17, 2010.
On December 1, 2010 the court was again asked by MRS to reconsider the prior orders
herein. On February 16, 2011 the court issued its Order on Reconsideration affirming all prior
orders herein.
The instant matter is before the court on MRS's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's Order on Reconsideration dated February 16, 2011 and a Motion to File an Amended

Complaint. Both motions are contained in a single document filed February 23, 2011. MRS has
also filed an Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on February 23, 2011.
The court, prior to issuing its February 16, 2011 Order on Reconsideration made a
thorough review of all prior proceedings herein, the facts and the law pertaining to this case and
finds nothing in the instant Motion for Reconsideration which would suggest that the February
16, 2011 Order on Reconsideration should be modified.
"The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). We
consider: "(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749,
185 p .3d 258, 261 (2008).
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Against these criteria the court perceives this issue to be one of discretion, understands
the boundaries of the discretion, believes the case has been appropriately considered by the court
in previous decisions herein, and that the arguments made by counsel in their Brief in support of
the instant Motion for Reconsideration do not add anything of substance to the case.
As to the Motion to File an Amended Complaint, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)
allows parties to amend a pleading on leave of the court and that "leave should be freely given
when justice so requires". Idaho R. Civ. P. 15 (a). The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear
that leave to amend is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Indian Springs LLC v. Indian
Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 750, 215 P.3d 457, 470 (2009). This standard applies
even after the trial court has entered summary judgment. In Indian Springs the trial court denied
the defendant's post-summary judgment motion to amend the pleading. The Idaho Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's determination using the traditional abuse of discretion standard. Id.
Proper application of discretion involves: "(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this
discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Indian Springs,
147 Idaho at 750 (quoting Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 881, 42
P.3d 672, 674 (2002)).
Against this standard this court perceives this issue as a matter of discretion.
As to the second criteria the court notes that this case was filed in September 2008, and
there has been considerable time for discovery and for the parties to perfect their claims.
Requests for Admission and answers to such have been exchanged, and MRS has conducted a
deposition of BBC's agent. MRS filed a Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of

:~JD
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Motion for Summary Judgment on March 19, 2009 to which BBC concurred on April 21, 2009.
On April 21, 2011 BBC provided some additional facts which MRS asserted were not material
(Plaintiffs Reply Brief filed May 5, 2009).

In other words, the parties do not disagree

regarding the basic facts of the case. MRS sought a summary judgment in its favor as a
substitute for trial and to complete the case entirely, on its merits, which was denied. BBC
thereafter sought a summary judgment which was granted. The November 17, 2010 Judgment
of $10,658.00 against MRS has been executed upon by BBC and that as of March 3, 2011 there
had been $7,481.00 collected by BBC and that $3,396.68 remained uncollected from MRS as of
that date.
Given the foregoing, the court finds that the Motion to File an Amendment Complaint is
untimely. It is simply an attempt by MRS to circumvent the effects of the unfavorable summary
judgment, the method MRS itself chose to try to complete this case without trial and the
November 17, 2010 Judgment, both to the favor of BBC previously entered by the court. The
proposed amended complaint is not based upon newly discovered evidence but upon facts well
known to both parties since before the action herein was commenced by MRS.
The court further finds that the proposed amended complaint is and has been made for the
sake of delaying the consequences of the prior orders herein.
In the Indian Springs case, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of a
motion filed by some of the defendants (the Andersons) to amend their pleading, after summary
judgment had been returned against them. The court stated,
"Here, we find that the district court's decision to deny the Andersen's motion to add a
counterclaim may be sustained on the ground of untimeliness. The only reason the Andersen's
provide for waiting to add a counterclaim is that they thought title was the more important issue
1

..q ~~
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until after the court's entry of summary judgment. The motion was not based on newly
discovered evidence, but rather on facts known to the Andersens even before the action was
commenced. Furthermore, the district court determined that the Andersens' motion to amend
their complaint was "simply an additional attempt by [the Andersens] to circumvent the
summary judgment decision previously entered by the [district court]." This Court has held that
if a trial court finds bad faith or a dilatory motive on the part of the movant, leave to amend the
pleadings should not be granted. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272, 561 P.2d
1299, 1305 (1977). Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of the Andersens' motion to
amend the pleadings ... "
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion to File an Amended Complaint filed February 23 2011 are both hereby DENIED.

~

Dated this 24 day of April 2011

Steven A. Gardner, Magistrate Judge
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3.

The issues which the appellant intends to assert in the appeal are the following:
a.

Did the magistrate court commit reversible error when it found that

Bonneville Billing and Collections has not converted MRS' property interest?
b.

Did the magistrate court commit reversible error when it found that

Bonneville Billing and Collections has not been unjustly enriched at the expense of MRS?
c.

Did the magistrate court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow MRS to

file an amended complaint?
4.

There has been no order entered sealing any portion of the record in this case.

5.

The appellant requests no transcript be prepared on appeal.

6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: The
entire magistrate court file.
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SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

414 Shoup Avenue
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
(208) 524-0731
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-2008-0005817
Plaintiff,

APPELLATE BRIEF

vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND COLLECTIONS,
INC, a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

I.

INTRODUCTION.
This matter comes before the court on appeal from the Magistrate Court's Judgment

dated November 17, 2010 against plaintiff Medical Recovery Services ("MRS") entered pursuant
to the Magistrate Court's Order dated August 24, 2010 granting defendant's, Bonneville Billing
and Collections' ("BB&C''), motion for summary judgment.
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II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

DATE:

EVENT:

April 23, 2008

MRS files a complaint against Stacie Christ in case number
CV-08-2399;1

June 4, 2008

MRS obtains judgment against Stacie Christ for the amount of
2
$1,868.15 ;

June 12, 2008

MRS obtains an order for continuing garnishment against Stacie
Christ's employer, Western States Equipment Company
(hereinafter "WSEC"); 3

June 18, 2008

MRS, through the Bonneville County Sheriff, serves a Writ of
Execution and Notice of Continuing Garnishment on Stacie Christ's
4
employer, WSEC;

June 23, 2008

WSEC returns the Acknowledgement of Receipt of Garnishment to
5
the Bonneville County Sheriff;

July 10, 2008

WSEC inadvertently sends Check No. 0708908235 in the amount
of $331.00 to defendant, BB&C, rather than to the Bonneville
County Sheriff. The mistake was the result of BB&C being
sequentially next to "Bonneville County Sheriff" on a pull-down
6
computer menu;

July 24, 2008

WSEC inadvertently sends Check No. 0708971963 in the amount
of $394.84 to defendant, BB&C, rather than to the Bonneville
County Sheriff. The mistake was the result of BB&C being
sequentially next to "Bonneville County Sheriff" on a pull-down
computer menu/

August 7, 2008

WSEC inadvertently sends Check No. 0808036464 in the amount
of $357.38 to defendant, BB&C, rather than to the Bonneville
County Sheriff. The mistake was the result of BB&C being
sequentially next to "Bonneville County Sheriff" on a pull-down

1

See Magistrate Court file.

2

See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.

4

See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.

7

See Magistrate Court file.
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computer menu;

10

11
12

13
14
15
16
17

8

August 20, 2008

Bonneville County Sheriff Deputy, Sherrie Berggren, informs MRS,
via letter, that Alice Hannaford, the payroll administrator for
WSEC, had informed her that WSEC had mistakenly sent the
checks to BB&C rather than to the Bonneville County Sheriff and
that Alice Hannaford had spoken to Clayne Bodily, the office
manager of BB&C, and explained the mistake and that Mr. Bodily
9
chose to keep the money;

August 21, 2008

MRS sends a demand letter to BB&C explaining the situation and
10
demanding that it return the $1,083.21 to WSEC within ten days;

August 28, 2009

BB&C sends a response letter to MRS stating that it had received
the above described checks and that it refuses to return the
11
$1,083.21 to WSEC;

Sept. 18, 2008

MRS files a complaint against BB&C in the current action in
12
Bonneville County for conversion and unjust enrichment;

Nov. 6, 2008

BB&C admits that before the filing of this action, it had knowledge
that WSEC inadvertently sent the checks to it; 13

March 19, 2009

MRS files a Motion for Summary Judgment, Notice of Hearing,
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of
Bryan N. Zollinger, and Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in
14
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;

June 4, 2009

The court enters the order denying MRS' motion for summary
15
judgment;

June 11, 2009

The court enters judgment against MRS;

July 20, 2009

MRS files its notice of appeal.

See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.

APPELLATE BRIEF - Page 3
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\8006\Pleadings\0040 Appellate Brief.doc

17

16

MRS files its appellate brief.

October 7, 2009

BB&C files its Appellate/Respondent's brief.

October 26, 2009

MRS files its Appellate reply brief.

Nov. 5, 2009

MRS files Augmentation of Appellate Brief.

Nov. 19, 2009

The District Court issues Notice of Intent to Dismiss Appeal for
22
Lack of Jurisdiction.

Nov. 25, 2009

MRS files Motion to Vacate Partial Judgment and Brief in Support
23
of Motion to Vacate Partial Judgment with the Magistrate Court.

Dec. 11,2009

District court enters Order of Dismissal for the appellate case.

April 8, 2010

MRS files Motion for Reconsideration and Brief in Support of
25
Motion for Reconsideration.

May 12, 2010

BB&C files its Supplemental Brief on its Motion for Summary
26
Judgment.

July 7, 2010

The court enters its Order on Motion to Reconsider, denying the
27
motion.

August 24, 2010

The court enters Order granting Summary Judgment for BB&C.

Sept. 3, 2010

BB&C files its Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees.

Sept. 27, 2010

MRS files its Objection to Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and
30
Attorney Fees and Affidavit of Bryan Zollinger.

18

See District Court appellate file.

19

See District Court appellate file.

20

See District Court appellate file.

21

See District Court appellate file.

22

See District Court appellate file.

23

See Magistrate Court file.

24

See District Court appellate file.

25

See Magistrate Court file.

26

27
28

18

August 17, 2009

See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.

29

See Magistrate Court file.

30

See Magistrate Court file.
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19

20

21

24

28

29

Ill.

Nov. 17, 2010

The court enters judgment and issues the Order on Settlement of
Attorney Fees and Costs, requiring MRS to pay attorney fees and
31
costs in the amount of $10,658.00.

Dec. 1, 2010

MRS files a Motion for Reconsideration.

January 13, 2011

MRS files its Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration.

January 31, 2011

BB&C files Objection to Motion for Reconsideration. 34

February 1, 2011

MRS files Brief in Reply to Objection to Motion for
35
Reconsideration.

February 16, 2011

The court issues Order on Reconsideration, denying Motion for
36
Reconsideration, upholding Summary Judgment for BB&C.

February 23, 2011

MRS files Motion for Reconsideration, Brief in Support of Motion
for Reconsideration, Motion to File an Amended Complaint, Brief
in Support of Motion to File an Amended Complaint, and
37
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.

April 29, 2011

The court issues Order on Motion for Reconsideration and Motion
38
to File an Amended Complaint.

May 3, 2011

MRS files Notice of Appeal.

32

33

39

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
"On appeal from the grant of ... summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is

the same as the standard used by the ... [magistrate] court originally ruling on the motion."
P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237 (2007). That standard

31

See Magistrate Court file.

32

See Magistrate Court file.

33

See Magistrate Court file.

34

See Magistrate Court file.

35

See Magistrate Court file.

36

See Magistrate Court file.

37

See Magistrate Court file.

38
39

See Magistrate Court file.
See Magistrate Court file.

APPELLATE BRIEF - Page 5
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\8006\Pleadings\0040 Appellate Brief.doc

~q ,-. -"1
.
'·
1
........ v -L.

is stated in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which states that "if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." As such,
"[t]his Court exercises free review over the entire record that was before the ... [magistrate]
judge to determine whether either side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and reviews
the inferences drawn by the [magistrate] judge to determine whether the record reasonably
supports those inferences." P.O. Ventures, 144 Idaho at 237.
IV.

ISSUES ON APPEAL.
A.

Did the Magistrate Court commit reversible error when it ruled that MRS' Lien

Was Not Property BB&C Could convert?
B.

Did the Magistrate Court commit reversible error when it found that BB&C has

not been unjustly enriched through the collection efforts of MRS?
C.

Did the Magistrate Court commit reversible error when it found that BB&C does

not hold the garnished wages in a constructive trust for the benefit of MRS?
D.

Did the Magistrate Court commit reversible error when it denied MRS' Motion to

Amend the Complaint?

V.

F.

Is MRS entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees on appeal?

G.

Should the Court order BB&C To Return The Money It Garnished From MRS?

MRS HAS A RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION TO STACIE CHRIST'S GARNISHED
WAGES SUPERIOR TO ANY RIGHT OF BB&C.
Central to the Court's analysis is whether MRS had any property right in the proceeds

BB&C received. If MRS has a property right greater than BB&C's property right, then the Court
should determine that BB&C converted MRS' property for the undisputed value of the property.
APPELLATE BRIEF - Page 6
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For the reasons set forth below, the writ of garnishment MRS served upon WSEC against Stacie
Christ's wages created in MRS a property right in the garnished wages superior to any property
right in BB&C.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "an attachment, duly and regularly issued and
levied, becomes a lien on the property . ..." Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Runkel, 16 Idaho 192, 101 P.
396, 398 (1909) (emphasis added); see also Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco v. Smith, 42
Idaho 224, 244 P. 1102, 1103 (1926) ("The plaintiff in the attachment action obtained a lien
upon the pledged property in the hands of the pledgee bank by virtue of the garnishment
proceedings.") Furthermore, "[g]arnishment ... is the process by which the garnishee is
brought into court, and also that by which the defendant's credit or property is attached in the
garnishee's hands. Its service is constructive seizure by notice. It is attachment in the hands of
a third person." Eagleson v. Rubin, 16 Idaho 92, 100 P. 765, 767 (1909) (emphasis added).
Additionally, "[u]pon the levy of a writ of attachment the property attached is in the custody of

the law, held to meet and pay any judgment which the attaching creditor may recover and
1

possession of the attached property vests in the officer until the property is disposed of.1 Letz
v. Letz, 215 P.2d 534, 538 (Mont. 1950) (emphasis added). "A sheriff serving a writ of

attachment is an officer of the court ... [and] [h]e is the agent of the attaching creditor and the
attached property in the custody of the sheriff is constructively in the possession of the

attaching creditor." Bass v. Stodd, 357 F.2d 458, 464 (9th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). Lastly,
the attaching creditor's lien becomes "perfected as of the date of service of the paperwork on
the garnishee by the sheriff." In re Aughenbaugh, 2002 WL 33939738, 4 (Bkrtcy.D.ldaho 2002);
see also Kaesemeyer v. Smith, 22 Idaho 1, 123 P. 943, 948 (1912) ("[T]he garnishment of the
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bank before such check has been presented creates a lien on the deposit superior to that of the
payee of the check.")
As the attaching creditor and by virtue of the Bonneville County Sheriff acting as its
"agent," MRS received a perfected lien upon the wages of Stacie Christ on June 18, 2008, the
date that MRS' agent (the Bonneville County Sheriff) served the writ of execution on WSEC. As
of this date, MRS' agent had "constructively seized" the wages, or property, of Stacie Christ that
WSEC held, and those wages were then in the "legal custody" and "constructive possession" of
MRS' agent, being held "to pay and meet" MRS' judgment. Moreover, MRS' lien upon the
wages was "superior" to any property interest BB&C may have, as BB&C did not have any
property interest in the wages-not a lien and not even right of possession having come into
possession only by accident and only after MRS perfected its lien. Even the Magistrate Court
agreed that MRS had a lien on the garnished wages.
VI.

40

BB&C CONVERTED MRS' LIEN INTEREST.
A.

A Lien In Property Is An Interest BB&C Can Convert.

The Supreme Court of Idaho has stated:
"Conversion is any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's
personal property in denial or inconsistent with his rights therein, such as a tortuous
taking of another's chattels, or any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority,

personally or by procurement, over another's goods, depriving him of the possession,
permanently or for an indefinite time. The act must be essentially tortuous, but it is not
essential to conversion sufficient to support the action of trover that the defendant
should have complete manucaption of the property, or that he apply the property to his
own use, if he has exercised dominion over it, in exclusion of, in defiance of, or
inconsistent with the owner's right." 26 R. C. L. 1098, § 3.
"In other words, conversion is a dealing by a person with chattels not belonging

to him, in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the owner."
40

See February 16, 2011 Order On Reconsideration, p.3.
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Schlieff v. Bistline, 52 Idaho 353, P.2d 726, 728 (1932) (emphasis added).
"A right of action accrues in favor of the owner of property as soon as the property is

wrongfully taken from his possession or wrongfully converted." Peasley Transfer & Storage Co.
v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743 (1999). Furthermore, intent is not a necessary element of
conversion, rather only a positive act of dominion over another's property is all that is required.

Id. "An actor may be liable where he has in fact exercised dominion or control, although he
may be quite unaware of existence of rights with which he interferes, and a defendant's
intention, good or bad faith, and his knowledge or mistake are immaterial." Id. (emphasis
added). "[N]o evidence of a conversion exists until there is proof, first, that a proper demand
for possession was made by the one who is entitled thereto and, second, that the possessor
wrongfully refused delivery." Id.
Neither title nor possession is required to support a claim of conversion. "A plaintiff in a
conversion action must establish that he had title to the property or had the right to possess

the property at the time of the conversion," Western Idaho Production Credit Ass'n v. Simplot
Feed Lots, Inc., 106 Idaho 260, 678 P.2d 52 (1984) (citing National Produce Distributors v. Miles
& Meyer, Inc., 75 Idaho 460, 274 P.2d 831 (1954) (emphasis added).
Courts outside of Idaho have been even more specific in stating that a lien meets the
"right to possess" requirement and supports a claim of conversion. In this regard,
"[o]wnership" is a flexible term and includes a range of interests including proprietary interest
and mere possessory rights:
[A]ny person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or
withholder," a definition used for purposes of larceny, robbery and related offenses. Our
case law further acknowledges that "[t]he term owner is one of general application and
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includes one having an interest other than the full legal and beneficial title .... The word
owner is one of flexible meaning, and it varies from an absolute proprietary interest to a
mere possessory right .... It is not a technical term and, thus, is not confined to a person
who has the absolute right in a chattel, but also applies to a person who has possession
and control thereof. (Internal quotation marks omitted)
Payne v. TK Auto Wholesalers, 98 Conn.App. 533, 911 A.2d 747, 752 (2006). (citing Label
Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 329, 852 A.2d 703 {2004}.

In U.S. v. Haviland Agricultural Chemical Company, 489 F.Supp. 42 (W.D. Michigan, 1980),
a debtor sold farm machinery securing a loan from plaintiff, an agency of the United States
Government. The debtor then used the money to pay another creditor, the defendant, who
refused to return the money. The court allowed that the refusal could meet the requirements
of conversion stating:
"An action for conversion has been stated by the plaintiff, specifically as follows:~
10. On or about January 26, 1974 the aforesaid Irving Salow turned over $1,706.94 of
the sale proceeds unlawfully to the defendant. Thereby defendant converted to its own
use property belonging to plaintiff. .. this Court concludes that the lien interest, whether
perfected or not, is a property interest ..."
(Id. at 43).

A lien constitutes a sufficient interest in personal property to support a conversion claim.
Imperial Valley L. Co. v. Globe G. & M. Co., 187 Cal. 352, 353-54, 202 P. 129 {1921). A third party

may be liable for conversion where the third party interferes with a lienholder's right in the
property. Hartford Financial Corp. v. Burns, 96 Cal.App.3d 591, 158 Cal.Rptr. 169 (1979). "A
mere contractual right is not sufficient for conversion, but a lien is." Formers Ins. Exchange v.
Zerin, 53 Cal. App. 4th 445, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 707 (1997). See also Case Corp. v. Gehrke, 208 Ariz.

140, 91 P.3d 362 (App. 2004) (A retailer's use of sale proceeds gave rise to a viable conversion
claim because the lienholder had a security interest in such proceeds.) "[P]roperty interest may
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be shown by a possession or a present right to possession when the defendant cannot show a

better right ..." Buck v. Gillham, 80 Ark. App. 375, 96 S.W.3d 750 (Ct. App. 2003} (emphasis
added).
In Tzovolos v. Wiseman, 51 Conn. Supp. 532 (2007) (aff'd in 300 Conn. 247, 12 A.3d 563
(2011), the court ruled that defendants had converted a lender's security interest in property
when they took restaurant equipment. Id. at 569. The lender on the equipment had a perfected
purchase money security interest. Id. The defendants took the equipment to satisfy the debt
borrower owed them, and refused to return the property even after a verbal demand notifying
them of the higher priority lien. Id. at 569-70. Furthermore, defendants told the lender that if
he sought to recover the property, the legal fees would cost more than the property was worth.

Id. at 571.
The court ruled that "(a]lthough proof of absolute and unqualified title is ... sufficient,
proof of an immediate right to possession at the time of conversion is all that is required in the
way of title or possession to enable the plaintiff to recover." Id. at 568. (emphasis added).
BB&C is analogous to the defendants in Tzovolos because they too refused to return the
property after demand. MRS sent a demand letter to BB&C explaining that BB&C received MRS'
garnished proceeds and demanding that it return the $1,083.21 to WSEC within ten days.

41

In

response, BB&C sent a letter to MRS stating that it had received the garnished proceeds and
that it refused to return the $1,083.21 to WSEC.

42

It is BB&C's exercise of dominion and control

over the money belonging to MRS inconsistent with MRS' rights after MRS put BB&C on notice

41

See Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Fact No.

42

See Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Fact No.

10.
11.
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that makes BB&C's conduct a wrongful conversion.
By virtue of its lien, MRS has established better ownership to the garnished wages than
BB&C. MRS has shown a present right to possession, and BB&C has exercised wrongful
dominion over the property in denial or derogation of and inconsistent with the superior right
of MRS.
B.

The Court Erred When It Ruled MRS' Lien Is Not A Property Right BB&C Could
Convert.

In its Order On Reconsideration dated February 16, 2011, the Magistrate Court held that
"the service of the garnishment documents by the Bonneville County Sherriff to WSEC did not
create an ownership of the property in MRS, but a lien only."

43

The Magistrate Court relied on

Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, for its position that MRS' lien does not create ownership in

Christ's garnished wages. The court fundamentally misstated the holding of that case.
In Chavez, under a divorce decree, the wife had a lien on personal property sale
proceeds from the sale of the house that husband received in the divorce. Id. at 216. Husband
extinguished the lien through execution of a judgment against wife. Id. Wife then sought quiet
title to the proceeds from husband's refinancing the house and half of the real property
interest. Id. at 217. The court held that the wife held only a personal property lien which
conferred no interest in the underlying real property. Id. at 221. In other words, she owned only
the money, not the realty, and she didn't even own the money after the extinguishment. The
court stated that "a lien transfers no title to the property subject to the lien" because her lien in
the sale proceeds never transferred to her any interest (lien or otherwise) in the underlying real
property. Id.
43

See February 16, 2011 Order On Reconsideration, p.3.
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The wife in Chavez had no claim to the real property. She had a lien that attached only
to the real property sale proceeds. This explains why the court in Chavez stated that the wife's
lien did not create ownership in the real property. Chavez does not say that a lien is not a
property right another can convert. For these reasons, Chavez does not apply.
C.

BB&C Converted MRS' Lien Interest.

The plaintiff in a conversion action merely needs a better right to the personal property
sought than the defendant. Western Idaho, 106 Idaho 260, Buck, 80 Ark. App. 375. BB&C
claims that its right to possession stems from having a collection account for Stacie Christ, but it
is clear that MRS' right is superior because the garnishment was for the benefit of MRS, and
BB&C was the inadvertent recipient who refused to return MRS' money. BB&C's actions meet
the requirements of conversion, particularly because the Magistrate Court ruled that MRS has a
lien on the garnished wages.
VII.

44

BB&C'S CONDUCT AMOUNTS TO UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
A.

BB&C Has Been Unjustly Enriched By MRS' Efforts.

Unjust enrichment "allows recovery where the defendant has received a benefit from the
plaintiff that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain without compensating the
plaintiff for the value of the benefit." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153, 1161
(2009). In order to establish a prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must
establish that three elements exist: "(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without

44

See February 16, 2011 Order On Reconsideration, p.3.
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payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133
Idaho 82, 88 (1999). see also Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923, 927 (Ohio 1938) ("Unjust
enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and
equity belong to another.").
Here (1) MRS conferred a benefit upon BB&C by filing suit, obtaining judgment, and
garnishing wages from Stacie Christ on whom BB&C had a collection account and from whose
employer BB&C serendipitously received three checks in the amount of $1,083.21-all without
having to lift a finger; (2) BB&C has "appreciated" the benefit because BB&C has accepted and
retained the money from the three checks; and (3) BB&C has accepted the checks under
circumstances that would be inequitable for BB&C to retain them without payment to MRS for
their value because the money is a windfall for BB&C to the detriment of MRS who is still
uncompensated for the effort, cost and expense of obtaining the funds.
In Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, /nc.,117 Idaho 591, Chinchurreta obtained a
judgment against a derelict nursing home operator. Id at 592. The nursing home also owed
money to the Christensens. In the operator's absence, the Christensens paid $40,000 out of
pocket to run the nursing home during January 1988 for which the state paid $24,000 to the
facility. Id. at 593. The lender attached the January money to satisfy his judgment, and the
Christensens contested. Id.
The court held that the Christensens had an equitable right to the funds because they
had operated the facility during January. Id. Rather than releasing the attached funds to
Chinchurreta, the district judge set up a constructive trust, recognizing legal title to the funds in
the nursing home operator, but granting an equitable title to the Christensens. Id. The court
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held that Chinchurreta had no claim to the funds except through the nursing home operator,
who, in turn, had no claim to the funds because he had performed none of the services and
made none of the expenditures that led to the $24,000 payment from the state. Id. at 594. The
appellate court summarized "The services for which the money has been disbursed were
performed by the Christensens. The district court determined that releasing the January money
to Chinchurreta rather than to them would create an unjust enrichment. The constructive trust
was imposed upon the funds in order to prevent this result. We find no error." Id.
Just as the Christensen's paid for the nursing home operations for January 1988, MRS
incurred out of pocket costs for filing fees, service fees, sheriff's fees and legal fees to secure the
garnishment. Just as the payment from the state came only due to the Christensen's
expenditures, there would have been no garnishment here without MRS' expenditures. Just as
the court created a constructive trust in favor of the Christensens, this Court should create a
constructive trust here in favor of MRS. But for MRS' effort, there would have been no
disbursement. Therefore, BB&C received a benefit from MRS and is unjustly enriched by
retaining the wages, and a constructive trust should be created in favor of MRS. Until BB&C:
pays for the value of the benefit, it has been unjustly enriched to MRS' detriment.
B.

BB&C'S Violation Of Idaho Code Section 18-2403 Compels The Conclusion That
BB&C Has Been Unjustly Enriched.

In relevant part, Idaho Code Section 18-2403 states:

(1) A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of
property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully
takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.
(2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's property,
with the intent prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, committed in any of the

following ways:
(a) By deception obtains or exerts control over property of the owner;

0 .·-
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(b) By conduct heretofore defined or know as larceny; common law larceny by trick;
embezzlement; extortion; obtaining property, money or labor under false presentences;
or receiving stolen goods;
(c) By acquiring Jost property. A person acquires lost property when he exercises
control over property of another which he knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to
have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or the nature or
amount of the property, without taking reasonable measures to return such property
to the owner; or a person commits theft of lost or mislaid property when he:
1. Knows or learns the identity of the owner or knows, or is aware of, or learns of
a reasonable method of identifying the owner; and
2. Fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to the owner; and
3. Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the
property.
Idaho Code§ 18-2403 (emphasis added.)
Idaho Code§ 18-2402(6) defines owner as "any person who has a right to possession
thereof superior to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder." Idaho Code §§ 18-2407 and 182408 make theft of property with a value in excess of one thousand dollars {$1,000) felony
grand theft. In discussing §18-2403, one Idaho court has explained the following:
It is well established at common law that one who finds and appropriates lost
property acquires a complete right thereto against all the world except the true owner.
Morgan and Bros. Manhattan Storage Co. v. McGuire, 114 Misc.2d 951, 452 N.Y.S.2d 986
(1982); Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211, 221 (Del.1980); Paset v. Old Orchard Bank &
Trust Co., 62 lll.App.3d 534, 19 Ill.Dec. 389, 378 N.E.2d 1264 (1978). See also 36A C.J.S.
Finding Lost Goods§ 5 (1961); 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property,§
19 (1962). In general, the character of the thing found does not affect the property
rights of the finder. However, should the finder know or have reasonable means of
discovering the true owner, he must do so or he may be guilty of larceny. See, e.g., 1
Am.Jur. Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property,§ 28.

***
Idaho criminal law embodies this principle, providing that a person may be held
criminally liable for theft "when he exercises control over property of another which he
knows to have been lost or mislaid ... without taking reasonable measures to return the
property to the owner." l.C. § 18-2403(2)(c). (Emphasis added).

State v. Evans, 119 Idaho 383, 386 (Ct. App. 1991.}
Idaho Code makes the obtaining and withholding of another's property, with a value in
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excess of a thousand dollars, grand theft when the property has "been delivered under a
mistake as to the identity of the recipient" and the party thereafter "learns the identity of the
owner." Idaho Code § 18-2403 is nearly identical to theft provisions of several other states,
which have held that parties who received funds as a result of mistaken delivery are guilty of
theft. See Cora v. State, 2009 WL 1471732 (Ark. App. 2009).
In Cora, a finance company mistakenly sent a payment to a boat dealer in behalf of a
purchaser who had already obtained other financing and used that other financing to pay for
the boat. The boat dealer did not know of the overpayment and used the mistakenly sent funds
to pay expenses learning only later that it had received the mistaken payment. When the boat
dealer could not repay the amount it had mistakenly received, the state charged and convicted
the boat dealer of theft under a statute nearly identical to Idaho Code§ 18-2403(c).
Here, the same result follows. Stacie Christ's employer mistakenly sent the garnishment
checks to "Bonneville Billing and Collections" instead of "Bonneville County Sheriff." MRS is an
"owner" because MRS' rights to the mistakenly delivered money are superior to BB&C who
merely possesses the mistakenly delivered funds. See Idaho Code§ 18-2402(6) (which defines
owner as "any person who has a right to possession thereof superior to that of the taker,
obtainer or withholder").
As soon as BB&C learned the identity of MRS as the owner of the funds, exercised
dominion and control over the funds, and refused to return the funds, BB&C committed felony
grand theft under Idaho Code§ 18-2403. This wrongful act amounts to grand theft under Idaho
law. See Idaho Code§§ 18-2407 and 18-2408. Even if the Bonneville County Sheriff or WSEC
were the true owner and not MRS, the conduct amounting to grand theft against the Bonneville
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County Sheriff, WSEC or MRS necessarily makes that conduct at least unjust enrichment, if not
conversion.
The Magistrate Court ignored the plain language of Section 18-2403{c).

45

Instead, the

Magistrate Court relied on State v. Culbreth, supra, 146 Idaho at 322, for the proposition that
BB&C would have to employ "deception, trick, extortion, false pretenses or false promise" for
Section 18-2403 to apply. However, the court in Culbreth applied its analysis to subparts (a), (b)
and (d) of Section 18-2403. The court's discussion in Culbreth never addressed subpart (c) of
Section 18-2403. This is important because MRS claims that subpart (c) of Section 18-2403 is
the subsection that applies here because this subpart addresses BB&C's exercising control over
property which it knew to have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the
recipient. In other words, there are multiple subparts to Section 18-2403. The Magistrate Court
never addressed the applicability of Section 18-2403(c) to the facts of this case.
VIII.

MRS IS ENTITLED TO A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN WHICH BB&C HOLDS THE GARNISHED
WAGES IN TRUST FOR MRS.
Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and justice,

where the parties do not intend to create such a relation, and often directly contrary to the
intention of the one holding the legal title. Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 288 P. 160 (1930). "If
one party obtains the legal title to property, not only by fraud or by violation of confidence or of
fiduciary relations, but in any other unconscientious manner, so that he cannot equitably retain
the property which really belongs to another, equity carries out its theory of a double
ownership, equitable and legal, by impressing a constructive trust upon the property in favor of

45

See Order On Motion To Reconsider, dated June 29, 2010, p.2.
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the one who is in good conscience entitled to it, and who is considered in equity as the
beneficial owner." Id.
Constructive trusts "are obligations created by law when money or property has been
placed in one person's possession, under such circumstances that in equity and good
conscience, he ought not to retain it." Warm Springs Properties, Inc. v. Andora Villa, Inc., 96
Idaho 270, 526 P. 2d 1106 (1974) (Citing Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955)).
"Where a person receives a benefit from another he is liable to pay therefor if the
circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that as between the two it is unjust for him to
retain it." Id.
"A constructive trust is a remedial device created primarily to prevent unjust
enrichment; equity compels the restoration to another of property to which the holder thereof
is not justly entitled ... A constructive trust may be imposed in practically any case where there is
a wrongful acquisition or detention of property to which another is entitled." Chinchurreta v.

Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 790 P.2d 372 (Ct. App. 1989) (Citing Taylor v.
Polackwich, 145 Cal.App.3d 1014, 194 Cal.Rptr. 8, 13 (2nd Dist.1983)) (emphasis added).
In Chinchurretta the court held that a constructive trust existed where the result of
enforcement of the attachment would be unjust enrichment. Chinchurreta v. Evergreen, 117
Idaho 591. The court held that a trust existed such that the nursing home operator had legal
title and the Christensens had equitable title. Id. at 594. Because BB&C is unjustly enriched in
retaining the garnished wages, the court should hold that MRS holds equitable title to the
wages.
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IX.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED MRS TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT AS
REQUESTED.
A.

Standard Of Review.

l.R.C.P. 15(a) provides that "a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court ... and
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires ...." The grant or denial of leave to amend
after a responsive pleading has been filed is a matter that is within the discretion of the trial
court and is subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion. Black Canyon
Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900 (1991).

The court may consider whether the new claims the amended complaint proposes to
insert into the action state a valid claim. If the amended pleading does not set out a valid claim
or if the delay would prejudice the opposing party by the delay in adding the new claim, it is not
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the amended complaint. Id.
(citing Bissett v. State, 111 Idaho 865, 869, 727 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Ct.App.1986)). Conversely, if
the amended pleading does set out a valid claim and the opposing party would not be
prejudiced by the delay, it is an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to file the amended
complaint.
B.

The Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied MRS' Motion To File An
Amended Complaint.

MRS filed the Motion to File An Amended Complaint on the grounds and for the reasons
that (1) the defendant's motion for summary judgment was filed after minimal discovery, before
discovery was closed, before a trial date was set and therefore was more akin to a motion for
judgment on the pleadings which courts generally grant with leave to amend; and (2) MRS sought
to file an amended complaint to raise claims for Claim and Delivery under Idaho Code Section 8-
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301, et seq. (Common Law Replevin and Detinue), Lien Foreclosure, and Intentional Interference
With A Prospective Economic Advantage after this Court's February 16, 2011 order stated for the
first time that MRS has a lien on the proceeds BB&C was holding.

46

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure lS(a) states, in pertinent part:
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the
party may so amend it at any time within twenty (20) days after it is served. Otherwise

a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. . . . (Emphasis
added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "A court should liberally grant a motion to
amend a complaint." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, 138 Idaho 487,
492 (2003)(citing Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342 (2001)). "The purpose
behind allowing a party to amend its complaint is so all claims will be decided on their merits
and to provide notice of the claim and the facts at issue." /d.(citing Carl H. Christensen Family
Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866 (1999)).

The Idaho Supreme Court, relying on language from the United States Supreme Court,
has said:
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the
absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive
on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."
Smith v. Great Basis Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 273 (1977)(citing Farnan v. Davis, 371U.S.178,

182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)) (emphasis added).
46

See February 16, 2011 Order On Reconsideration, p.3.
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The policy behind allowing a plaintiff to amend his complaint is so strong that the Idaho
Supreme Court has reversed a trial court for failing to allow a plaintiff to amend his compliant
where the plaintiff made a motion to file an amended complaint after the court had granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Sinclair Marketing, Inc. v. Siepert, 107 Idaho 1000
(1985). However, a plaintiff must file a motion to amend his complaint after entry of summary
judgment to qualify for Rule 15{a)'s liberal application. Walker v. Idaho Board of Highway

Directors, 96 Idaho 41 (1974). See also Maharishi Hardy Blechman LTD v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Company, 292 F.Supp.2d 535, 554-555 {2003){holding that "the Court has discretion to grant a
party leave to amend its complaint even after that complaint is dismissed on summary
judgment" and affirming such action where (1) discovery was relatively modest; (2) a complaint
more limited in scope may raise a triable issue; and (3) the defendant's challenge was more like
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for judgment on the pleadings that courts
routinely grant leave to amend unless it determines that any amendment would be futile}.
In Smith v. Great Basis Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266 (1977), the trial court granted summary
judgment to all defendants and further granted leave to the plaintiffs to amend their
complaints. One of the defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint because the
amended complaint stated a new cause of action against it. In affirming the district court's
allowing the plaintiff to amend its complaint, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "The
changes in the amended complaints do reflect a new legal theory of recovery against defendant
Millers. There is no problem with this, however, since the basic facts giving rise to a right of

recovery remain unaltered. The mandate of l.R.C.P. 15{a) is that leave to amend "shall be freely
given when justice so requires." Id. at 272 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court
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concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to file an
amended complaint and affirmed the trial court's decision on appeal.
Here, the Magistrate Court should have exercised its discretion in favor of allowing MRS
to file an amended complaint. The proposed amended complaint reflected new legal theories
of recovery based on the same set of undisputed facts already submitted to the court.
Therefore, no new discovery was really needed; but even if it were, discovery had not been
closed. In fact, this case had not even been set for trial.
Moreover, MRS (not the defendant) initially moved for summary judgment to test its
own pleadings. The defendant moved for summary judgment in response to MRS having moved
for summary judgment. The early procedural challenge is important because it makes the
challenge to the pleadings akin to a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, which courts usually grant with leave to amend. Another important factor is that the
Magistrate Court raised the issue that MRS has a lien and not ownership of the garnished
wages. The defendant never raised this as an issue in the case. MRS should have been given
the opportunity to file an amended complaint to address that issue which the Magistrate Court
raised for the first time in the case.
Finally, given that only modest discovery was necessary to develop the undisputed
record and that the pleadings were tested very early in this case even before any trial date was
set or discovery closed, the defendant could not establish any prejudice.
C.

The Court Wrongly Found That There Was Bad Faith Or Dilatory Motive When It
Denied MRS' Motion To File An Amended Complaint.

In its Order On Motion For Reconsideration And Motion To File An Amended Complaint
dated April 29, 2011, the Court wrongly held that MRS filed its proposed amended complaint
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"for the sake of delaying the consequences of the prior orders herein." 47 The court wrongly
speculates without citing any evidence to support this finding. In its February 16, 2011 Order
On Reconsideration, the court essentially ruled that MRS is not an owner of the property and
therefore, could not recover on any proposed theory. The court also ruled that MRS merely had
a lien and wrongly cited Chavez to state that a lien grants no interest in property.
The first substantive ruling holding that MRS has a lien, but also holding that a lien grants
no rights, led MRS to consider new applicable theories. MRS sought not to delay, but to enforce
the court identified lien right. This led MRS to discover that it had a cause of action under a
claim and delivery theory.
The Magistrate Court erred in holding that MRS had dilatory motive or exercised bad
faith because there were new, viable theories of the case based on the only substantive ruling
the Magistrate Court ever made. No evidence exists in the record to support this "bad faith"
finding.
X.

THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER BB&C TO RETURN THE MONEY IT HAS GARNISHED.
An appellate court has authority to order a losing party on appeal to immediately return

all the money that party recovered on the judgment the appellate court reverses. BECO Const.
Co., Inc. v. J-U-8 Engineers, Inc., 149 Idaho 294 (2010). Here, MRS fully expects that this Court
will reverse the decision of the Magistrate Court and remand this matter accordingly. As part of
the remand, this Court should order that BB&C immediately pay to MRS all money that BB&C
garnished from MRS in full satisfaction of the judgment the Magistrate Court wrongfully entered

47

See Order On Motion For Reconsideration And Motion To File An Amended Complaint, April 29, 2011. p. 4.
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against MRS. In this regard, BB&C garnished MRS and has received payment in full on the
judgment.
XI.

MRS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.
As the prevailing party on appeal, MRS is entitled to an award of attorney's fees under§

12-120{1) because the amount pleaded is less than $25,000. Loftus v. Snake River School
District, 130 Idaho 426 {1997). Moreover, MRS is entitled to an award of costs under l.A.R. 40.
Accordingly, MRS requests that the court award it attorney's fees and costs.
XII.

CONCLUSION.
For all the reasons set forth above, MRS respectfully requests that {1) the court reverse

the judgment of the Magistrate Court against MRS; (2) vacate the order granting BB&C's motion
for summary judgment; {3) direct that the Magistrate Court grant MRS' motion for summary
judgment; (4) order BB&C to immediately repay all amounts it garnished MRS for; and (4) award
MRS attorney's fees an~;:.n appeal.
DATED

this~ day of July, 2011.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

sq,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Medical Recovery Services, LLC
J
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this~~f July, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy

of the forgoing APPELLATE BRIEF to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and
depositing it in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or
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Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES,
PLLC,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS, INC.,
Defendant/Respondent.

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 08-5817

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
A.

FACTS.

In April 2008 Medical Recovery Services (MRS) filed a complaint against Stacie Christ
("Christ"), obtained a judgment in June 2008 for $1,868.15, and then garnished Christ's wages at
Western States Equipment Company ("WSEC"). WSEC garnished Christ's wages, and on July 10,
July 24 and August 7, 2008, WSEC sent WSEC checks by mistake to Bonneville Billing and
Collections, Inc. ("BBC") totaling $1,0831.21.
BBC had also filed a complaint against Christ in May 2008, for $325.50 principal, $15.61
interest, $300.00 attorney fees, $66.00 filing fee, and the service fee cost. BBC had also sent a
demand letter to Christ for another account on July 30, 2008, in the amount of $966.86.
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BBC applied the WSEC checks to its complaint against Christ and the accounts BBC was
pursuing against Christ. BBC knew that WSEC was the employer of Christ. BBC believed that the
WSEC checks it received from WSEC for Christ were from a voluntary wage assignment.
On August 27, 2008, BBC dismissed its case against Christ and did not assess any attorney
fees to the settlement of the case thus benefitting Christ $300.00.
On October 9, 2008, BBC filed suit against Christ in Bonneville County Case No. 08-6263,
praying for $552.22 principal, $78.25 interest and attorney fees of$350.00. On December 11, 2008,
BBC obtained a judgment for $1,065.47 in Case No. CV 08-6263. This judgment was subsequently
satisfied by a continuing wage garnishment from Christ's wages from WSEC.
On August 20, 2008, Clayne Bodily, BBC's manager, spoke with WSEC which indicated that
WSEC had mistakenly sent WSEC checks to BBC for Christ, but that WSEC would now send the
checks to the Bonneville County Sheriff. Bodily asked if BBC could keep the WSEC checks it had
already deposited and applied to Christ's accounts with BBC, and ifWSEC could just continue the
MRS garnishment.

WSEC did not contact BBC again regarding this request. Bodily was later

informed by WSEC that they had been instructed by MRS's attorney Bryan D. Smith not to speak
with BBC.
BBC did not return the checks to WSEC as demanded by MRS because BBC had accounts of
Christ assigned to it for collection and Christ did, in fact, owe on those accounts. WSEC never
demanded the return of the checks. The amounts owed by Christ were greater than the amounts
which BBC received from WSEC. IfBBC would not have had any accounts of Christ assigned to it
for collection at the time it received the checks from WSEC, then it would not have kept the checks,
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but would have returned them to WSEC as there would have been no moneys owing from Christ to
BBC.
There was a continuing garnishment of Christ's wages from at least July 2008 through at
least April 2009 and Christ continued to be employed at WSEC during that entire time. MRS
discontinued the garnishment against Christ and, in fact, instructed WSEC to stop payment on a
check or to recall a check from the Bonneville County Sheriff from WSEC which had continued to
garnish the wages of Christ. WSEC was obligated to continue the garnishment and was continuing
the garnishment until ordered to discontinue the garnishment by MRS. IfMRS had continued its
garnishment rather than discontinuing it in order to pursue this litigation, then MRS would have
received the equivalent amount from WSEC that BBC received from WSEC by October 2008 and
this matter would be moot.
On August 21, 2008, MRS sent a letter to BBC demanding BBC return the $1,083.21 to
WSEC and threatening a lawsuit. BBC responded by letter and refused to return the $1,083.21.

B.

PROCEDURE.

On September 18, 2008, MRS filed suit against BBC for conversion, unjust enrichment and
constructive trust. MRS moved for summary judgment on March 19, 2009. On June 4, 2009, the
magistrate court denied MRS's motion for summary judgment concluding that BBC had not
"converted" MRS's property nor had it been "unjustly enriched." The magistrate court concluded
that the MRS's claim against BBC was not sustainable. MRS then appealed that decision which the
district court dismissed as not appealable. MRS then filed its first motion for reconsideration. On
July 7, 2010, the magistrate court (Judge Linda Cook) denied MRS's motion.
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On August 24, 2010, the magistrate court (Judge Linda Cook) granted BBC's motion for
summary judgment finding that MRS's complaint failed to state a cause of action against BBC as a
matter of law, awarded judgment against MRS, dismissed with prejudice MRS's complaint and
awarded BBC attorney fees and costs. On September 3, 2010, BBC filed its memorandum of costs
and attorney fees. MRS failed to timely filed an objection to the memorandum of costs and fees. On
November 17, 2010,judgment was entered against MRS for attorney fees and costs in the amount of
$10,658.
On December 2, 2010, MRS filed its second motion for reconsideration.

Again, the

magistrate court (Judge Steven A. Gardner) denied the motion. Again, MRS filed another motion for
reconsideration, its third such motion. After nearly two years from filing its complaint MRS also
filed a new motion to amend the complaint and add causes of action for claim and delivery, lien
foreclosure and intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. For the third time
the magistrate court (Judge Steven A. Gardner) on April 29, 2011, again denied the motion to
reconsider, and also denied the motion to amend the complaint. On May 3, 2011, MRS appealed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
"Where an order of a lower court is correct, albeit based on a different theory than that found

to be dispositive by this Court, the lower court order will be affirmed. Southern Idaho Realty v.

Hellhake and Associates, Inc., 102 Idaho 613, 636 P.2d 168 (1981); Matter of Revello, 100 Idaho
829, 606 P.2d 933 (1979); Robison v. Compton, 97 Idaho 615, 549 P.2d 274 (1976); City of Weippe

v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319, 528 P.2d 201 (1974)." Sheppardv. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7 (Idaho 1982).
"This [C]ourt must uphold the finding and judgment of the trial court if it is capable of being upheld
on any theory." Fischer v. Fischer, 92 Idaho 379, 382, 443 P.2d 463, 466 (1968)." Mortensen v.
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Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 235 P.3d 387, 396 (Idaho 2010). "This Court may uphold
decisions on alternate grounds from those stated in the findings of fact and conclusions of law on
appeal. See Hanfv. Syringa Realty Co., Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 370, 816 P.2d 320, 326 (1991) (citing
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 627 P.2d 317 (1981) and Anderson & Naftiger v. G. T
Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179, 595 P.2d 709, 713 (1979))." Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451,
454 (Idaho 2003)
"Error will not be presumed on appeal but must be affirmatively shown on the record by
appellant." Triad Leasing & Financial, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., 148 Idaho 503, 224
P.3d 1092, 1100 (Idaho 2009).

11

As the appealing party, [the appellant] carries the burden of

showing that the district court committed error. See Western Cmty. Ins. Co. v. Kickers, Inc., 137
Idaho 305, 306, 48 P.3d 634, 635 (2002). 11 Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95
P.3d 977, 983 (Idaho 2004).

III.

ARGUMENT.
A.

THE IDAHO GARNISHMENT STATUTES GOVERN.

"When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and effect to the legislature's
intent in passing the statute. Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336 (1994). It
must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." McLean v. Maverick Country
Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813 (2006) (citations omitted). " Where the language of a statute is
plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in
statutory construction." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999)." Wheeler v. Idaho Department
of Health and Welfare, 2009 ID 0409 .181, page 7. "We interpret statutes according to the plain,
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express meaning of a provision in question, and we will resort to judicial construction only if the
provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Peasley

Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 742 (1999). "The Court interprets statutes
according to their plain, express meaning, but will resort to judicial construction when the statute is
"ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Ada County Highway

Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323, 329 (Idaho 2008). "If the
statutory language is unambiguous, we merely apply the statute as written." Sumpter v. Holland

Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 93 P.3d 680, 682 (Idaho 2004).
The following unambiguous Idaho statutes deal with garnishments and control in this matter:
All persons having in their possession or under their control, any credits or other
personal property belonging to the defendant, at the time of service upon them of a copy of
the writ and notice, as provided in the last two (2) sections, shall be, unless such property be
delivered up or transferred, or such debts be paid to the sheriff, liable to the plaintiff for the
amount of such credits, property, or debts, until the attachment be discharged or any
judgment recovered by him be satisfied.
Idaho Code Section 8-508 (emphasis added).
When the garnishee is the employer of the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor,
upon application to the court, shall have issued by the clerk of court, a continuing
garnishment directing the employer-garnishee to pay to the sheriff such future moneys
coming due to the judgment debtor as may come due to said judgment debtor as a result of
the judgment debtor's employment. This continuing garnishment shall continue in force and
effect until the judgment is satisfied. The creditor shall be solely responsible for insuring that
the amounts garnished do not exceed the amount due on the judgment. If additional
garnishments are issued during the term of a continuing garnishment and the continuing
garnishment is the maximum allowed under the provisions of section 11-207, Idaho Code,
the additional garnishments cannot be served until the continuing garnishment is satisfied, or
until the amount taken by the continuing garnishment is less than the maximum allowed;
additional garnishments issued during the term of a continuing garnishment must be served
in the order in which presented.
Idaho Code Section 8-509(b)(emphasis added).
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Any person who has been served with a copy of the writ and notice as provided in
sections 8-506--8-508, 11-201, 16-603, 16-604, or 16-1104, shall be deemed a garnishee, and
service of copy of writ and the notice therein provided for, shall, for the purpose of sections
8-510--8-523, be deemed to be notice of garnishment, and whenever any person shall have
been served with notice of garnishment as herein defined, he may discharge himself by
paying or delivering to the officer all debts owing by him to the defendant, or a portion
thereof sufficient to discharge the claim of the plaintiff, or any or all money of the defendant
in his hands to a similar amount, taking a receipt therefor from the officer, which shall
discharge such person from any and all liability to the extent of such payment, and which
shall be held by the officer subject to the orders of the court out of which the writ issued.
Idaho Code Section 8-510 (emphasis added).
If the garnishee admits in his answer that he is indebted to the defendant, or has
money or property of the defendant in his hands, or under his control, and fails or refuses to
tum the same over to the officer as in section 8-510 is provided, the plaintiff may move the
court out of which the writ issued, on or before the return day thereof, for judgment against
the garnishee for the amount of such admitted debt, or for the delivery to the officer of the
money or property of the defendant in his hands, to an amount sufficient to satisfy the
plaintiffs claim; serving the garnishee with due notice of the said motion; and at the hearing
thereof the court shall render such judgment as shall be conformable to law and the facts
shown to exist.

Idaho Code Section 8-516 (emphasis added).

B.

MRS HAS NO PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WSEC CHECKS WRITTEN TO BBC

BY THE GARNISHEE WSEC AND NOT IN THE POSSESSION OF WSEC.
"The remedy by attachment is entirely statutory, and the requirements of the statute must be
substantially followed; otherwise, the attaching creditor acquires no superior right or lien upon the
debtor's property." American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Walmstad, 44 Idaho 786, 792 (1927). "The
right of attachment by garnishment was unknown to the common law, and is purely of statutory
regulation, and where the statute provides for the procedure in such cases, the plaintiff is only
required to pursue such course in order to sustain his action against the garnishee." Eagleson v.
Rubin, I 6 Idaho 92, 100 (1909).
Eagleson v. Rubin provides that the "right of attachment by garnishment was unknown to the
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common law, and is purely of statutory regulation, and where the statute provides for the procedure
in such cases, the plaintiff is only required to pursue such course in order to sustain his action against
the garnishee." Id. at 100. Additionally, Eagleson provides the following regarding garnishees:
"Garnishment is the admonition judicially given to the attachment defendant's debtor or holder of
property, warning him against payment or restoration to the defendant, and bidding him hold the
property or credit subject to the order of court. It is the process by which the garnishee is brought into
court, and also that by which the defendant's credit or property is attached in the garnishee's hands.
Its service is constructive seizure by notice. It is attachment in the hands of a third person."
Id. (emphasis added).

"With reference to the execution of the writ of attachment C. S., sec. 6784, provides that
personal property capable of manual delivery must be attached by taking it into custody. In case of
tangible property, susceptible of manual seizure and delivery, such property must be actually seized
and taken into possession by the levying officer, and that officer must take and maintain actual
custody and control of the property by such means as will exclude others from such custody." Id. at
793.
The cases cited by MRS do not support its position that it has any rights in WSEC checks
written from a WSEC account to BBC and not WSEC's (the garnishee's) possession. MRS cites
Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Runkel, I 6 Idaho 192 ( 1909) for the proposition that an attachment, duly and

regularly issued and levied, becomes a lien on the property. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Runkel involved
an intervener action regarding real property. Potlatch also involved a former statute ofldaho, sec.
4302, Rev. Codes. Real property is not a fact of the instant case.
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In Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco v. Smith, 42 Idaho 224 (1926), the plaintiff
obtained a lien upon the pledged property in the hands of the pledgee bank by virtue of the
garnishment proceedings. The case says nothing of any property right against a third party who is
not a garnishee and not subject to the garnishment. The case dealt with the sheriff having in his
possession the property, not a third party. The case indicates that all controversies between the
plaintiff and the garnishee as to ownership of the property are for decision by the court in which the
writ issued. Id. at 229.
Additionally, In re Aughenbaugh, 2002 WL 33939738 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002), dealt with the
property in the hands of the garnishee not a third party. The case provided that service of the writ of
garnishment created a lien but did not constitute an irrevocable or absolute transfer of the debtor's
rights in the proceeds or property. The case provided that with respect to a debtor's creditors, funds
in the hands of a third party not subject to the claim of the debtor are not subject to attachment.
A garnishment is "the process by which the garnishee is brought into court, and also
that by which the defendant's credit or property is attached in the garnishee's hands. Its
service is constructive seizure by notice. It is attachment in the hands of a third person."
Eagleon v. Rubin, 16 Idaho 92, 100 P. 765, 767 (1909) (quoting Waples, Attachment and
Garnishment, § 469). Inland is correct in its assertion that service of the writ of garnishment
created a lien on the property held in the hands of the garnishee--here, the Sheriffs
Department. " 'By the service in the manner provided by statute, whether it be termed
'garnishment' or 'service of the attachment,' while the possession is not necessarily disturbed,
'a lien is obtained on defendant's title to the property in the hands of the garnishee.' ' "
Sullivan v. Mabey, 45 Idaho 595, 264 P. 233, 236 (1928) (quoting Kimball v. RichardsonKimball Co., 111 Cal. 386, 43 P. 1111 (1896)). "The plaintiff in the attachment action
obtained a lien upon the pledged property in the hands of the pledgee bank by virtue of the
garnishment proceedings." Fed. Res. Bank ofSan Francisco v. Smith, 42 Idaho 224, 244 P.
1102, 1103 (1926). See also Trustee, Ltd. v. Bowen-Hall, Inc. (In re Pro-Ida Foods, Inc.), 88
I.B.C.R. 219, 221-22 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1988) (noting that garnishment creates a lien for the
purpose of an avoidable preference action under 11 U.S.C. § 547).
This does not mean that Inland is entitled to the relief which it seeks. Inland wishes, in
effect, to foreclose its lien by garnishing Mr. Ducommun's wages. However, all of the Idaho
authorities for the proposition that garnishment creates a lien limit that lien to property
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actually held by the garnishee. E.g., Sullivan, supra, 264 P. at 236 ("'[A] lien is obtained on
defendant's title to the property in the hands of the garnishee' ") (emphasis added). Possession
by the garnishee is, therefore, a necessary element for existence of the garnishment lien.
This accords with other Idaho law. Garnishment is, as Eagleson noted, "attachment in
the hands of a third person." 100 P. at 767. In the case of American Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
Walmstad, 44 Idaho 786, 260 P. 168 (1927), a sheriff served a writ of attachment against
certain property and issued a proper return, but apparently failed to take possession of the
property as the return indicated. Because the attachment statute required the sheriff to take
personal possession of the property, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the attachment
failed.
. .... the lien thereof was absolutely lost when the [employer] or his keeper permitted
appellant to take and retain possession of the property. Even the return of the [employer]
does not purport to indicate that he continued in possession, and the evidence is entirely
uncontradicted that at least from September 1st to the date of sale this property was out of the
control of the officer, and was in no sense in custodia legis. The lien of the attaching creditor,
if any he ever had, was dependent upon the continuation of possession by the [employer].
The lien that [creditor] had by virtue of the garnishment was over a portion of those wages
that [debtor] earned in May, 1993. Those funds are no longer in the possession of the
[employer], the garnishee. There is, therefore, no lien against those funds.

In re Loren v. Ducommun, 159 B.R. 919, 920-921 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 1993)(emphasis added).
In this matter the sheriff never obtained possession of the WSEC checks in question from
WSEC. The garnishee, WSEC, made payments directly to BBC not to the sheriff. WSEC made
payments on its own banking account to BBC. The MRS's garnishment remains in force and effect
until the judgment is satisfied. WSEC, as the garnishee, remains liable for the judgment. WSEC
could discharge its liability by paying to the sheriff the amount of the debt. WSEC attempted to
comply with the statute by continuing the garnishment, but MRS stopped the garnishment and
returned garnished funds back to the sheriff.
MRS has no rights in checks written to BBC by the garnishee, WSEC, on WSEC's own bank
account. MRS has no lien in WSEC checks which are not in the possession of WSEC but in the
possession of BBC. MRS' s claim, if any, is against WSEC as the garnishee. WSEC, as the
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garnishee, remains liable to MRS until the garnishment is satisfied pursuant to Idaho statute. This is
the plain meaning and intent of the garnishment statutes.

C.

BBC HAS NOT CONVERTED ANY PROPERTY OF MRS.

"Conversion" has been defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over
another's personal property in denial [of] or inconsistent with [the] rights therein." Torix v. Allred,
100 Idaho 905, 910 (1980). "A complaint which alleges that plaintiff is the owner and entitled to
the possession of property therein described and that defendant converted it to his own use, and
which states the value of the property, or alleges that plaintiff has been damaged in a sum named,
sufficiently states a cause of action for conversion, unless other averments are required by statute.

See Williamsv. Bone,74Idaho 185, 187-88(1953)." Id
BBC had valid, legal accounts assigned to it for which it was pursuing collection against
Christ when WSEC sent WSEC checks to BBC. The amount of the accounts assigned to BBC
exceeded the amount of the checks it received from WSEC. The checks were written on WSEC's
account. BBC has never had in its possession any property of MRS. BBC acted reasonably and in
good faith in retaining the checks ofWSEC and applying them to the accounts of Christ. BBC had
no duty to inquire as to the WSEC checks. BBC had no notice of any UCC filing creating any
priority or lien. There is simply no conversion of MRS property by BBC.

D.

BBC HAS NOT BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY MRS.

A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was a benefit
conferred upon the defendant Qy the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the Defendant of such benefit; and
(3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to
retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. Vanderford Co., Inc. v.
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Knudson, 165 P.3d 261, 272 (2007)(emphasis added). Unjust enrichment is an equitable claim and
"[e]quitable claims will not be considered when an adequate legal remedy is available." Iron Eagle

Development, L.L.C. v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 492 (2003).
In this matter MRS did not confer any benefit upon BBC. If receipt ofWSEC checks is the
alleged benefit conferred upon BBC, then it is WSEC which conferred the benefit and not MRS.
MRS has never claimed that it directed WSEC to write checks to BBC. There simply was no benefit
conferred upon BBC by MRS.
It is not inequitable for BBC to have accepted the benefit from WSEC as BBC had accounts

for which Christ owed. It is not inequitable for BBC to retain the checks received from WSEC as
MRS would have still received payment from WSEC under the continuing garnishment which would
have satisfied the judgment. However, rather than continuing to accept checks from the sheriffMRS
voluntarily discontinued the continuing garnishment which would have satisfied MRS' s judgment
against Christ. Furthermore, MRS has an adequate legal remedy against WSEC pursuant to Idaho
garnishment statutes. BBC simply has not been unjustly enriched by MRS.

E.

MRS HAS NO CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.

A constructive trust is a "remedial device created primarily to prevent unjust enrichment ... "

Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idhao 591, 790 P.2d 372 (Ct. App. 1989). Since
MRS did not confer any benefit upon BBC, there can be no unjust enrichment, and thus there can be
no constructive trust. Furthermore, there is no need for a equitable remedy when a legal remedy is
available through the garnishment statutes. See Iron Eagle Development, L.L. C. v. Quality Design

Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487 (2003).
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F.

THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MRS'S

THREE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION.
"The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). MJ:lS's
arguments "do not add anything of substance to the case." Order on Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to File and Amended Complaint, p. 2. The magistrate court has not abused its discretion in
reaching the same conclusion five different times that BBC is entitled to summary judgment against
MRS.

G.

THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MRS'S

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT.
"A trial court's rulings on a motion in limine, a motion to amend the pleadings to add a claim
for punitive damages, and a motion to amend the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(b) are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion .... Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 484, 129 P.3d 1223, 1233 (2006)(Rule
15(b))(emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that leave to amend is a matter
within the trial court's discretion." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho
737, 750, 215 P.3d 457, 470 (2009). "The magistrate's discretionary decisions will be upheld absent
a showing that the court abused its discretion. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 563, 944 P.2d 695,
698 (1997)." Hunt v. Hunt, 137 Idaho 18, 43 P.3d 777, 779 (Idaho 2002). A court abuses its
discretion if it fails to act consistently with legal standards. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568, 165
P.3d 273, 282 (2007)." Todd v. Sullivan Const. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 191P.3d196, 199 (Idaho
2008). "When reviewing a discretionary decision of the trial court this Court determines (1) whether
the court perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the court acted within the bounds of that
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discretion and applied the correct legal stai1dards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision
through an exercise of reason. Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d
816, 819 (2001 ). "American Pension Services, Inc. v. Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC, 14 7 Idaho
638, 213 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Idaho 2009).
MRS filed is complaint in September 2008. MRS has had considerable time for discovery.
MRS filed its own motion for summary judgment in March 2009. The magistrate court used its
proper discretion to deny the motion to file an amended complaint as untimely. As the magistrate
court acutely pointed out MRS's motion to amend complaint was "simply an attempt by MRS to
circumvent the effects of the unfavorable summary judgment." Order on Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to File and Amended Complaint, p. 4.

The proposed amended complaint was not

based upon any newly discovered evidence, but was made for the sake of delaying the consequences
of the prior orders. In this case, the magistrate court based its decision on Rule 15(b) and properly
exercised its discretion within the bounds of the magistrate court's authority and consistent with legal
standards.

H.

BBC WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

AS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THE MAGISTRATE COURT.
As the prevailing party in the matter below under five separate orders all finding for BBC and
against MRS, and issued by two different magistrate judges, BBC was entitled to an award of
attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code Section 12-120(1). Furthermore, MRS failed to timely
object to the amount of the award of attorney fees and costs to BBC.
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I.

BBC IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS ON

APPEAL.
As the prevailing party on appeal, BBC is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 12-120(1) and I.A.R. 40. Accordingly, BBC requests that the court award it its
attorney fees and costs in this matter.

IV.

CONCLUSION.
BBC has converted no property of MRS. BBC has not been unjustly enriched by MRS.

MRS does not have a claim against BBC upon which relief can be granted. MRS is not the real party
in interest. Under the Idaho garnishment statutes MRS's cause of action, if any, is against the
garnishee, WSEC. The garnishee, WSEC, remains liable to MRS pursuant to Idaho garnishment
statute until the garnishment is paid in full.
Two separate magistrate judges have ruled on five separate occasions regarding the same
issues before this court. Each time the magistrate judges have found against MRS and for BBC. The
magistrate court has made a "thorough review of all prior proceedings herein, the facts and the law
pertaining to this case." Order on Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to File and Amended
Complaint, p. 2.
MRS's appeal should be denied, the magistrate court's order granting summary judgment to
BBC and the court's three subsequent orders by two different judges denying MRS's repeated
motions for reconsideration and its motion to amend complaint should be affirmed, and BBC should
be awarded its attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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DATED this

gth

day of August, 2011.

~~=<
Todd R. Erikson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

following this

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the
day of August, 2011, by courthouse box:

gth

Bryan N. Zollinger
Bryan D. Smith
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 16

DUHTY
Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
Idaho State Bar# 4411
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-2008-0005817
Plaintiff,

REPLY BRIEF

vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND COLLECTIONS,
INC, a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

I.

BBC'S STATEMENT OF FACTS OMITS RELEVANT FACTS.
BBC says that it filed a complaint against Christ but omits that it had no judgment which

would have entitled BBC to collect on the claim. MRS does not dispute that BBC may have
initially reasonably believed that the money it received was from a voluntary wage assignment.
However, BBC could not continue this reasonable belief once BBC received MRS' demand letter
dated August 21, 2008 in which MRS informed BBC of the mistake regarding ownership and
delivery of the funds. After receiving the demand letter, BBC had actual notice that it had
received the funds by mistake.
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Moreover, BBC points out that it dismissed its complaint against Christ on August 27,
2008 in response to receiving the funds. However, BBC dismissed its complaint six days after
being notified that MRS had a superior claim to the funds. At this point, BBC could not
reasonably rely on receipt of the funds to dismiss its case because BBC knew by then that it had
received the funds by mistake.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
As explained in MRS' Opening Brief, "[o]n appeal from the grant of ... summary

judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the court
originally ruling on the motion." P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho
233, 237 (2007). Summary judgment is warranted only "if the pleadings, depositions,
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." l.R.C.P.
56(c).

Here, BBC argues in favor of a standard of review that is not a standard of review at all.
Instead, BBC cites law that the court can affirm on grounds other than those forming the basis
for a lower court's ruling. Implicit in BBC's argument is that the magistrate court's ruling is
incorrect but this Court should affirm anyway on alternative grounds. Thus, BBC appears to
concede that the magistrate court's analysis (i.e., MRS has a lien but BBC cannot convert that
lien) is incorrect, but there are other reasons this Court should uphold the grant of summary
judgment against MRS.

1

1

BBC's position explains why BBC does not address any of the cases MRS cites establishing that a party can convert
a lien and why BBC does not defend the magistrate court's ruling that MRS has a lien which cannot be converted.
BBC essentially concedes this point because it knows that if there is a lien, it can be converted. Necessarily, BBC
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MRS addresses each of these "alternative grounds" below.
Ill.

ANY REMEDY AGAINST WSEC UNDER THE GARNISHMENT STATUTE IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY AND DOES NOT PROTECT BBC FROM LIABILITY FOR CONVERSION.
BBC'S first "alternative ground" is to argue that MRS should have sued WSEC, not BBC.

BBC correctly points out that "this Court must strive to give force and effect to the legislature's
intent in passing the statute," Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336 (1994),
that the words of the statute "must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the

statute must be construed as a whole," Mclean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810,
813 (2006)(emphasis added.)
In this regard, under Idaho's garnishment statute, WSEC is liable to MRS for the amount
owed "unless such property be delivered up or transferred, or such debts be paid to the sheriff .
. . until the attachment be discharged or any judgment recovered by him be satisfied." Idaho
Code§ 8-508. Furthermore, a "continuing garnishment shall continue in force and effect until
the judgment is satisfied." Idaho Code§ 8-509(b}.
Here, BBC incorrectly argues that under§ 8-508 and 509 MRS' only claim is against
WSEC as garnishee. However, these statutes do not state or imply that MRS has an exclusive
remedy only against WSEC as a garnishee. This is simply an argument BBC makes without any
statutory language even implying such. BBC's reading that the remedy allowed under the
garnishment statute is MRS' sole remedy requires statutory construction that needlessly
expands the clear language of the statute. The clear intent of the garnishment statutes is to
allow recovery from WSEC for its failure to comply with the writ, not to make a garnishee liable
for the actions of an intervening tortfeasor like BBC.
must claim MRS did not have a lien or there are "alternative grounds" on which MRS should lose the case.
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BBC's argument does not comport with common sense. For example, say Walmart
knows that its parking lot is dark, unmonitored, and a place where its customers are routinely
robbed. Under BBC's argument, a robber would have no liability to a Walmart customer he
robbed in the parking lot because the customer's remedy would be to sue Walmart. Similarly,
the fact that WSEC may be liable does not absolve BBC of liability just as the fact that Wal mart
may be liable does not absolve the robber of liability.
IV.

MRS COULD NOT LAWFULLY CONTINUE TO GARNISH CHRIST AFTER THE JUDGMENT
AMOUNT HAD BEEN GARNISHED FROM CHRIST.
BBC's second "alternative ground" is to argue that MRS should have simply continued its

garnishment of Christ's wages until it had received the full amount of its judgment thereby
recovering the amount BBC converted. In other words, BBC argues that MRS had to over
garnish Christ or MRS has no claim against BBC. This argument also has no bearing on whether
MRS had a valid property interest and whether BBC converted that property interest.
Under applicable Idaho law, "[t]he creditor shall be solely responsible for insuring that
the amounts garnished do not exceed the amount due on the judgment." Idaho Code § 8509(b). The statute places the burden on the creditor to cease the garnishment when the
amount of the judgment has been garnished.
Here, MRS garnished $1,822.41 from Christ's wages on a judgment of $1,868.15. Rather
than run afoul of the law and incur potential liability for garnishing an amount that would
"exceed the amount due on the judgment," MRS recalled the garnishment. For some reason
that BBC fails to explain, BBC thinks that MRS should have allowed the garnishment to continue
until MRS got paid its judgment amount even though continuing the garnishment would have
exceeded the amount due on the judgment. BBC's reading of the statute would have denied
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Christ due process for contesting BBC's claims. Moreover, BBC's reading of the statute would
have cause MRS to violate Idaho law.
V.

MRS HAS A PROPERTY INTEREST IN THE FUNDS GARNISHED FROM CHRIST.
BBC's third "alternative ground" is to argue that MRS has no property rights in the actual

checks WSEC wrote to BBC even if MRS had a lien/property right in the actual garnished wages.
In this regard, MRS has already established that it has an interest in Christ's wages from the time
that they were in the hands of the WSEC. Even the magistrate court ruled that MRS had a lien in
the funds in WSEC's possession. BBC argues that Christ's garnished wages are different and
separate from the WSEC checks WSEC sent to BBC. According to BBC, although MRS may have
had a property right in Christ's wages, MRS had no property right in the WSEC checks.
This is like claiming that Jack stole Mike's car but did not convert Jill's cell phone that Jill
left in Mike's car-after all, Jack stole Mike's car, not Jill's cell phone. However, once Jack knows
Jill's cell phone was in the car, does not return it, and exercises dominion and control over it,
then Jack converted Jill's cell phone too. The car was simply a vehicle for transporting Jill's cell
phone. Similarly, WSEC's check was simply a vehicle for transporting Christ's funds against
which MRS had a lien.
BBC claims that only WSEC has a right to demand return of the checks, but this is
incorrect. In Gissel v. State, 111 Idaho 725 (1986}, the state seized and sold wild rice that the
plaintiffs harvested on state and federal lands. Id. at 726. The plaintiffs sought to recover the
portion of funds pertaining to the rice harvested on the federal lands. Id. The state argued that
the plaintiffs, as trespassers on the federal land, could not have acquired title to any portion of
the rice. Id. at 727. In essence, the state was claiming that only the federal government could
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claim right to the funds pertaining to the rice harvested on the federal lands. The Idaho
Supreme Court disagreed stating that "[o]ne who is otherwise liable to another for harm to or
interference with land or chattel is not relieved of the liability because a third person has a
legally protected interest in the land or chattel superior to that of the other." Gissel v. State, 111
Idaho 725 (1986). In other words, as prior possessors of the rice, the plaintiffs had a better right
to possession of the proceeds than the state; therefore, the state was not relieved of its liability
for conversion just because the forest service had a superior right to the plaintiffs.
Here, just like the state in Gissel could not defend against a claim for conversion arguing
that the federal government had a right to the funds the plaintiffs sought, BBC cannot defend
against MRS' claim for conversion arguing that WSEC has a right to the funds MRS seeks. BBC is
liable for conversion because it does not have an interest superior to MRS' interest in the funds,
regardless of whatever claim WSEC may have to the funds.
Couched in other terms, the state in Gissel claimed that only the true owner, the forest
service, should be able to claim the funds. Identically, BBC claims that even if MRS has an
interest, only WSEC should be able to claim the funds as the true owner of the funds. However,
BBC's only interest is mere possession that BBC obtained subject to MRS' prior lien. And BBC
fails to offer any explanation how its mere possessory interest is superior to MRS' prior lien.
Therefore, BBC's interest if any, is subject to both MRS and WSEC' interests, and the priority
between MRS and WSEC is irrelevant in this matter.
BBC cites Eagleson v. Rubin, 16 Idaho 92 (1909) for the proposition that the garnishment
failed when WSEC mistakenly sent it to BBC. This is an inaccurate reading, and Eagleson
supports MRS' position. Eagleson stands for the propositions that (1) personal property must

r . .~ ..,
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be garnished by manual delivery or taking into custody, and (2) attachment occurs "in the
garnishee's hands." Id. at 100. BBC appears to claim that because Christ's wages left WSEC's
possession, the garnishment somehow failed. Under Eagleson, Christ's wages were garnished
once WSEC had possession of them.
Moreover, Eagleson does not say nor does BBC offer any case that says a garnishment
fails due to a mistake of the garnishee after the garnishee takes possession. If BBC is claiming
that the garnishment failed because MRS did not take manual delivery or take custody, BBC is
also mistaken. The manual delivery or custody required in Eagleson occurred when WSEC
withheld the money from Christ's paycheck and took possession. MRS' interest attached at that
time before BBC ever came into possession.
BBC distinguishes Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Runkel, 16 Idaho 192, 101 P. 396, 398 (1909)
based on Potlatch involving attachment of real property rather than personal property. MRS
cites to this case merely to establish that garnishments create liens. Other Idaho cases support
this proposition as well and apply to facts where the lien is against personal property. For
example, a garnishment creates a lien on funds deposited in a bank account. Holloway v. First
Nat. Bank, 45 Idaho 746, 747 (1928). See also Sullivan v. Mabey, 45 Idaho 595, 597 (1928) (In

discussing attachment of money by way of garnishment, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that
(/while the possession is not necessarily disturbed, a lien is obtained on defendant's title to the
property in the hands of the garnishee"); and Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco v. Smith, 42
Idaho 224 (1926) ((/The plaintiff in the attachment action obtained a lien upon the pledged
property in the hands of the pledgee bank by virtue of the garnishment proceedings."}
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BBC tries to distinguish Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco v. Smith, Id. and In re
Aughenbaugh, 2002 WL 33939738, 4 (Bkrtcy.D.ldaho 2002) on the ground that they say nothing

about attachment in the hands of a third party not subject to the garnishment. MRS is not
claiming that a lien attached while in the hands of BBC (the third party not subject to the
garnishment), but that the lien attached in the hands of the garnishee (WSEC}. MRS' lien
attached before BBC obtained possession. If MRS had not sought the garnishment and obtained
its lien, BBC would not have even gained possession because BBC never would have taken the
funds from Christ's earnings and mistakenly sent them to BBC.
BBC claims that a lien is neither absolute nor an irrevocable transfer of debtor's rights.
Assuming this is true, MRS still has a better right than BBC to the funds because BBC has no
claim other than mere possession. The cases BBC attempts to distinguish allow for lien

attachment in the hands of the garnishee and make no provision for lien cancellation. Nor does
BBC describe or cite authority for how MRS' lien was extinguished after creation.
BBC argues that it had no actual or constructive notice of any lien on the funds when it
received the checks. This is irrelevant because actual notice of a priority interest existed when
MRS notified BBC of MRS' right in the funds. As discussed previously, MRS does not doubt BBC's
good faith prior to receiving MRS' demand letter, but after MRS made demand for the funds
BBC could no longer be acting in good faith because BBC refused to return the funds to MRS
knowing that MRS had a better right to the funds than BBC.
MRS agrees that no case discusses what happens when a third party interferes with a
properly attached garnishment through conversion. MRS submits that no case has addressed
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this situation because no party has ever been so brazen as to interfere in a garnishment in the
way that BBC has interfered.
VI.

BBC HAS BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY MRS.
BBC makes no effort to discuss the case of Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc.,

117 Idaho 591 (Ct.App. 1989) that MRS cited in its opening brief regarding unjust enrichment.
Instead, BBC just challenges the source conferring the benefit on BBC claiming that WSEC,
rather than MRS, conferred the benefit. However, MRS did the work to acquire and execute on
a judgment. Because of MRS' work acquiring and executing on the judgment, BBC received
Christ's money without having to do any of the work necessary for a judgment and execution.
All WSEC did was mistakenly sent the funds resulting from MRS' labors to BBC. BBC fails to
explain how the benefit would have been conferred without MRS' effort.
BBC cites Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487
(2003) for the proposition that unjust enrichment and constructive trust are not available as
equitable claims when an adequate legal remedy is available. Thus, according to BBC, MRS
cannot make equitable claims for unjust enrichment and constructive trust against BBC because
MRS has a legal remedy against WSEC.
However, the rule BBC relies on applies only where the same plaintiff makes a claim in
equity and also makes a legal claim against the same defendant. Id. at 492. Neither Iron Eagle
nor any other case prevents an equitable claim where a plaintiff has a legal claim against
another distinct defendant. For example, in Iron Eagle an equitable remedy was not available
for the litigants because of "[an] adequate legal remedy under ... express agreement1' between
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the parties. Id. In other words, a contract between the parties precluded equitable claims

between the same parties for relief.
In In re Boyd, 134 Idaho 669 (Ct.App. 2000), a defendant sought to preclude an equitable
claim on the grounds that an express contract existed between the plaintiff and another party
for the same contractual purpose, and therefore plaintiff had an adequate legal remedy. In re
Boyd at 673. The Idaho Court of Appeals was not persuaded stating "the express contract and
the implied-in-law contract involved different parties. Where an express contract exists, an
implied contract between the same parties for the same contractual purpose is precluded from
enforcement. Such is not the case here." Id. Accordingly, even assuming MRS had a legal claim
against WSEC, such a claim would not preclude equitable relief against BBC, a separate and
distinct party.
VII.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MRS' MOTION TO
AMEND THE COMPLAINT.
BBC claims that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in denying MRS' motion

to amend the complaint arguing that MRS had considerable time for discovery. Discovery time
is irrelevant in this case because MRS did not seek to amend its complaint based on discovery
issues. MRS sought to amend its complaint because the magistrate court finally recognized that
MRS had a lien on the Christ funds but ruled that a lien could not be converted. MRS
researched the legal issue and determined that a party could interfere/convert a lien interest
under little known aspects of Idaho's claim and delivery law dating back to the late 1800s.
The magistrate court further abused its discretion in holding that MRS' intent was to
"circumvent the effects of the unfavorable summary judgment." Order on Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to File an Amended Complaint, p.4 dated April 29, 2011. On this

,..,r . ....... -:,)

t"\

REPLY BRIEF - Page 10
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\8006\Pleadings\0041 Reply Brief.doc

finding, the magistrate court offered no evidence or reasoning because there was no bad faith
or dilatory motive. The magistrate court had repeatedly ruled that MRS had no right in the
Christ funds, and then in its order in support of summary judgment ruled that MRS had "only" a
lien. Again, once the magistrate court recognized MRS had a lien, but had not pleaded a valid
cause of action, MRS researched the legal issue and determined that a party could
interfere/convert a lien interest under little known aspects of Idaho's claim and delivery law
dating back to the late 1800s.
VIII.

CONCLUSION.
For all the reasons set forth above, MRS respectfully requests that (1) the Court reverse

the judgment of the magistrate court against MRS; (2) direct that the magistrate court grant
MRS' motion for summary judgment on conversion; alternatively, the Court should grant MRS'
motion for summary judgment on unjust enrichment or constructive trust; if the Court does not
grant summary judgment on any of these three theories, then the Court should grant the
motion to amend the complaint; (3) order BBC to immediately repay all amounts it garnished
MRS after recovering a judgment against MRS for attorney's fees and costs; and (4) award MRS
attorney's fees and costs on appeal and ordering the magistrate court to award attorney's fees
and costs to MRS for preva;_below.
DATED this

~~y of August, 2011.

Medical Recovery Services, LLC

[

i"~f
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Todd R. Erikson, Esq.
3456 East 17th Street, Suite 280
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
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MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. CV-2008-5817
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:
APPEAL

vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS, INC.,
Defendant/Respondant.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter is an appeal from the Magistrate's Judgment dated November 17, 2010,
against Medical Recovery Services, LLC (hereafter, "MRS") entered pursuant to the
Magistrate's Order dated August 24, 2010, granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of
Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. (hereafter, "BBC").
The dispute between MRS and BBC stems from a collection effort that MRS commenced
against Stacie Christ in April 2008. On April 23, 2008, MRS filed a complaint against Ms.
Christ, and on June 4, 2008, MRS obtained a judgment against her in the amount of $1,868.15.
On June 12, 2008, MRS obtained an Order for Continuing Garnishment against Ms. Christ's
employer, Western States Equipment Company (hereafter, "WSEC"). On June 18, 2008, the
Bonneville County Sherriff (hereafter, "BCS") served a Writ of Execution and Notice of
Continuing Garnishment (hereafter, "Writ") on WSEC. WSEC returned the Acknowledgment of
Receipt of Garnishment to BCS on June 23, 2008.
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On July 10, 2008, WSEC determined $331.00 of Ms. Christ's wages were subject to the
Writ WSEC cut a check in that amount but accidentally sent the check to BBC. WSEC
intended to make the check out BCS pursuant to the Writ, but inadvertently selected BBC instead
of BCS on a drop down menu when selecting the payee of the check. On July 24, 2008, WSEC
made the same mistake with a check for $394.84. WSEC made the mistake again on August 7,
2008, with a check for $357.38.
On August 20, 2008, BCS Deputy Sherrie Bergren infom1ed MRS of the mistake and
stated that BBC intended to keep the money. On August 21, 2008, MRS sent a demand letter to
BBC asking it to return the $1,083.21 (hereafter, "the disputed funds"). On August 28, 2008,
BBC sent a letter to MRS indicating it had received the three checks but it intended to retain the
money.
On September 18, 2008, MRS filed the complaint in this action alleging conversion and
unjust enrichment against BBC. On March 19, 2009 MRS filed a motion for summary judgment.
The Magistrate Court denied that motion on June 4, 2009, and entered judgment against MRS on
June 11, 2009. Both parties believed the Magistrate had entered a final judgment in favor of
BBC. The District Court, however, dismissed MRS's subsequent appeal, finding the Magistrate
had merely denied MRS's motion for summary judgment.
On April 8, 2010, MRS filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Magistrate denied
on July 7, 2010. On August 10, 2010, the Magistrate heard argument regarding BBC's motion
for summary judgment that had been filed on July 14, 2009. On August 24, 2010, the Magistrate
granted BBC's motion, dismissed MRS's complaint with prejudice, and awarded BBC attorney's
fees and costs. On November 17, 2010, the Magistrate Court entered judgment against MRS for
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $10,658.
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On December 1, 2010, MRS filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the
Magistrate Court denied on February 16, 201 L On February 23, 2011, MRS filed a third motion
to reconsider, which the Magistrate Court denied on April 29, 2011.
MRS filed this appeal on May 3, 2011.

II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION
I.R.C.P. 83(u) provides, in part:
The scope of appellate review on an appeal to the district court shall be as
follows:
(1) Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district
court, not involving a trial de novo, the district court shall review the case
on the record and determine the appeal as an appellate court in the same
manner and upon the same standards of review as an appeal from the
district court to the Supreme Court under the statutes and law of this state,
and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court.
When a district court sits as an appellate court, the record of the magistrate's proceeding
is examined "to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions oflaw follow from those
findings ... [F]indings of fact based on substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence
will not be set aside on appeal." Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561-62, 633 P.2d 1137,
1139-40 (1981) (rehearing denied); see also Bishcoff v. Cawing-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho
826, 748 P.2d 410 (Ct. App. 1987). Issues of law are freely reviewed by appellate courts.

Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 447, 915 P.2d 6, 9 (1996).
III. ISSUES
MRS raises five issues on appeal:
(1)

Whether the Magistrate Court erred when it ruled that BBC has not been unjustly
enriched through the collection efforts of MRS?
r
,...,
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(2)

Whether the Magistrate Court erred when it ruled that BBC was not liable for
conversion?

(3)

Whether the Magistrate Court erred when it ruled that BBC does not hold the
garnished wages in a constructive trust for the benefit of MRS?

(4)

Whether the Magistrate Court erred when it denied MRS's motion to amend its
complaint?

(5)

Whether either party is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal?
IV. DISCUSSION

BBC argues the Idaho Garnishment Statutes (Idaho Code§§ 8-508 and 8-509) govern
this dispute, and pursuant to those statutes MRS should seek recourse from WSEC. BBC also
argues "there is no need for an equitable remedy when a legal remedy is available through the
garnishment statutes." Respondent's Brief at 12.
Whether WSEC is liable to MRS under the garnishment statutes says nothing about
BBC's liability as an alleged tortfeasor. This Court therefore concludes MRS is not precluded
from asserting its conversion claim against BBC. Furthermore, the garnishment statutes do not
state or imply that recourse against the garnishee is the exclusive remedy available to a judgment
creditor in MRS's position. Thus, MRS's apparent ability to seek recourse against WSEC under
the garnishment statute does not preclude MRS from seeking recourse against BBC under other
theories of law. The parties agree there is no legal remedy MRS can seek or obtain against BBC
under the garnishment statutes. This Court concludes MRS is not precluded from asserting its
equitable claims of unjust enrichment and constructive trust.

r
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A. Unjust Enrichment
MRS asserts BBC has been unjustly enriched by the collection efforts of MRS. More
specifically, MRS asserts BBC would never have received the funds from WSEC if MRS had not
filed suit, obtained a judgment, and garnished Ms. Christ's wages.
BBC raises three issues regarding unjust enrichment: First, BBC asserts the benefit it
received was conferred by WSEC and not MRS. Second, BBC asserts it is equitable for BBC to
retain the funds because Ms. Christ owed on accounts owned by BBC. Third, BBC asserts
MRS' s efforts in obtaining the Writ are of minimal value because the process of obtaining such a
writ is not difficult.
Unjust enrichment "allows recovery where the defendant has received a benefit from the
plaintiff that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff
for the value of the benefit." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 ldaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153, 1161 (2009).
To establish a prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must establish three elements:
"(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of
such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for
the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof."

Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88 (1999).
The Magistrate Court held, "In the instant case, Plaintiff conferred no benefit on
Defendant because Plaintiff had no benefit to confer." Order on Reconsideration at 4.
The position taken by BBC implicitly and erroneously assumes the funds it received were
WSEC funds. Nothing in the record indicates WSEC owed any money to BBC. Once Ms.
Christ earned the disputed funds, WSEC became obligated to pay her. WSEC was not free to
give Ms. Christ's money to whomever it chose. The record does not show that Ms. Christ ever
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instructed WSEC to send her money to BBC. The Writ superseded, in part, WSEC's obligation
to pay Ms. Christ for her labor and created the obligation to instead deliver $1,083 .21 of her
earnings to MRS. Absent the Writ procured by MRS, therefore, the disputed funds would have
been delivered to Ms. Christ and would not have been sent to BBC.
The Magistrate's decision attributes no weight or value to the efforts of MRS in obtaining
the Writ. MRS undisputedly incurred out of pocket expenses for filing fees, service fees,
sheriff's fees, and legal fees to secure the Writ. Regardless of the amount MRS expended, this
Court is convinced BBC would not have received the funds absent MRS's efforts. Moreover,
absent instruction or consent from Ms. Christ, or a court order obligating BBC to distribute a
portion of Ms. Christ's wages to BBC, BBC had no right to retain the money. 1 This Court
therefore concludes it would be inequitable for BBC to retain those funds.
Lastly, this Court believes the degree of effort exerted by MRS in procuring the writ is
inconsequential. The elements of unjust enrichment require that some action by the plaintiffregardless of its significance--caused a benefit to be conferred on the defendant. Then, if the
defendant appreciated the benefit under circumstances manifesting inequity, the plaintiff has
made a prima facie showing of unjust enrichment. This Court concludes that whether it was
"easy" for MRS to file suit, obtain a judgment, and procure the Writ is not relevant to plaintiff's
prima facie case for unjust enrichment.
1

This Court is aware that Ms. Christ may have had a contractual duty to pay BBC. In the section
that follows, however, this Court concludes MRS had a lien interest in the disputed funds. There
is no evidence that BBC had an earlier lien or superior interest in those funds.
Furthermore, this Court is not persuaded by BBC's argument that MRS could have simply
continued the garnishment until it had been paid in full. Regardless of whether MRS could have
lawfully done so under the Garnishment Statutes, this Court does not believe MRS should have
been burdened to do so. From an equity standpoint alone, MRS had a superior interest in the
funds BBC erroneously received, BBC came into possession of the funds as a result of MRS's
efforts, and it would be inequitable for BBC to retain the funds.
I:''!".'
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B. Conversion

MRS asserts service of the Writ on WSEC created a lien on Ms. Christ's garnished wages
and that BBC converted that lien.
BBC does not dispute service of the Writ created a lien or that a lien can be converted.
BBC argues MRS' s conversion claim fails nonetheless because the lien terminated when the
garnished wages left WSEC's possession and BCS failed to take or maintain possession of them.
The Magistrate Court held, "This court ... finds in the instant case that the service of the
garnishment documents by the Bonneville County Sheriff to WSEC did not create an ownership
of the property in MRS, but a lien only." Order on Reconsideration at 3. In reaching that
conclusion, the court relied on the following authority:
A garnishment is "the process by which the garnishee is brought into
court, and also that by which the defendant's credit or property is attached in the
garnishee's hands. Its service is constructive seizure by notice. It is attachment in
the hands of a third person." Inland is correct in its assertion that service of the
writ of garnishment created a lien on the property held in the hands of the
garnishee-here the Sheriff's Department. "By the service in the manner provided
by statute, whether it be termed 'garnishment' or 'service of the attachment,'
while the possession is not necessarily disturbed, 'a lien is obtained on defendant's
title to the property in the hands of the garnishee."' "The plaintiff in the
attachment action obtained a lien upon the pledged property in the hands of the
pledgee bank by virtue of the garnishment proceedings."

In Re David & Laura Aughenbaugh, 2002 WL 33939738 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho) (quoting "In re
Ducommun, 159 B.R. 919 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 1993) (citations omitted)).
Despite holding that MRS had a lien on the garnished wages, the Magistrate court stated,
"MRS would have to be considered the owner of the property" in order to prevail on its
conversion claim. Order on Reconsideration at 3.
Generally, conversion is defined as a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted
over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with rights therein.
See Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337, 340 (1984). A
right of action accrues in favor of the owner of property as soon as the property is
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wrongfully taken from his possession or wrongfully converted. See Davidson v.
Davidson, 68 Idaho 58, 63, 188 P.2d 329, 332 (1947).

Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743, 979 P.2d 605, 616 (1999).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also stated, however, that "[a] plaintiff in a conversion
action must establish that he had title to the property or had the right to possess the property at
the time of the conversion." Western Idaho Production Credit Ass'n v. Simplot Feed Lots, Inc.,
106 Idaho 260, 678 P .2d 52 (1984) (emphasis added).
Under the common law, a chattel mortgagee had both title to and
possession of the mortgaged goods. If the property had been taken from his
possession, it is apparent that he could have maintained an action in conversion.
In many jurisdictions, including this state, it is now held that the chattel
mortgagee has not title but only a lien on the security, possession being in some
one else. But if the mortgage provides that the mortgagee can take possession of
the mortgaged goods for breach of the conditions of the mortgage, it is quite
generally held that he may maintain conversion against third parties into whose
hands the goods may have fallen. The courts hold that breach of the conditions of
the mortgage, coupled with the right to possession, give him such a qualified
ownership as will enable him to maintain an action of this kind. Backhaus v.
Buells, 43 Or. 558, 72 P. 976, 73 P. 342; First National Bank v. St. Anthony &
Dakota Elevator Co., 103 Minn. 82, 114 N. W. 265; Cone v. Ivinson, 4 Wyo. 203,
33 P. 31, 37, 35 P. 933.

Forbush v. San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 46 Idaho 231, 243, 266 P. 659, 663 (1928). See also
Carpenter v. Turrell, 148 Idaho 645, 227 P.3d 575 (2010).
This Court concludes the Magistrate erred when it concluded MRS must prove ownership
in order to maintain an action for conversion. This Court holds that MRS can maintain its
conversion claim if it had a lien interest coupled with the right to possess.
Idaho Code § 8-506 provides requirements that must be satisfied to "attach" various types
of prope1iy:
Debts and credits and other personal property not capable of manual
delivery must be attached by leaving with the person owing such debts, or having
in his possession or under his control such credits or other personal property, or
with his agent, a copy of the writ, and a notice that the debts owing by him to the
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defendant, or the credits or other personal property in his possession or under his
control, belonging to the defendants, are attached in pursuance of such writ.
Id at § 8-506(5).

Idaho Code § 8-509(b) outlines the garnishment process when the garnishee is the
employer of the judgment debtor. In such a situation, "the judgment creditor ... shall have
issued by the clerk of court, a continuing garnishment directing the employer-garnishee to pay to
the sheriff such future moneys coming due to the judgment debtor as may come due ... as a
result of the judgment debtor's employment." Id.
This Court holds that service of the Writ on WSEC created a lien in favor of MRS on
employment debts incurred by WSEC as a result of Ms. Christ's labor. Additionally, the Notice
of Continuing Garnishment instructed WSEC to "withhold the maximum amount of [Ms.
Christ's] disposable earnings at each disbursement interval" for the benefit of MRS. Thus, at
each "disbursement interval," MRS had both a lien interest in and a right to possess Ms. Christ's
garnished wages. Accordingly, this court holds that MRS had an interest in those funds
sufficient to maintain an action for conversion. BBC unquestionably exercised dominion over
the disputed funds, so the remaining question is whether MRS' s lien interest terminated when
WSEC accidentally sent the disputed funds to BBC. The answer to that question will determine
whether BBC "wrongfully" retained the funds.
BBC cites In re Ducommun in support of the argument that MRS lost its lien. 2 In re

Ducommun, discusses creation of a garnishment lien and then states the following:

2

Preliminarily, this Court questions the wisdom in permitting a garnishee to terminate a
garnishment lien by deliberately or accidentally giving garnished funds to someone other than
the levying officer or judgment creditor. In general, a lien is a "legal right or interest that a
creditor has in another's property, lasting usually until a debt or duty that it secures is satisfied."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Regarding property subject to a garnishment lien, a
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: APPEAL - 9

[A]ll of the Idaho authorities for the proposition that garnishment creates a lien
limit that lien to property actually held by the garnishee. E.g., Sullivan, supra, 264
P. at 236 ('"[A] lien is obtained on defendant's title to the property in the hands of
the garnishee "') (emphasis added). Possession by the garnishee is, therefore, a
necessary element for existence of the garnishment lien.
This accords with other Idaho law. Garnishment is, as Eagleson noted,
"attachment in the hands of a third person." 100 P. at 767. In the case of American
Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Walmstad, 44 Idaho 786, 260 P. 168 (1927), a sheriff
served a writ of attachment against [potato sacks] and issued a proper return, but
apparently failed to take possession of the property as the return indicated.
Because the attachment statute required the sheriff to take personal possession of
the property, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the attachment failed. The
Court then considered the effect if the return was correct and the sheriff had taken
possession of the property, but had failed to keep possession until the date the
property was sold.
However, if we should admit the truth of the statements in
the return that the levy was made in substantial compliance with
the law, the lien thereof was absolutely lost when the sheriff or his
keeper permitted appellant to take and retain possession of the
property. Even the return of the sheriff does not purport to indicate
that he continued in possession, and the evidence is entirely
uncontradicted that at least from September 1st to the date of sale
this property was out of the control of the officer, and was in no
sense in custodia legis. The lien of the attaching creditor, if any he
ever had, was dependent upon the continuation of possession by
the sheriff
260 P. at 171 (emphasis added).
The lien that Inland had by virtue of the garnishment was over a portion of
those wages that Mr. Ducommun earned in May, 1993. Those funds are no longer
in the possession of the . . . garnishee. There is, therefore, no lien against those
funds. Moreover, because any funds the [garnishee] presently owes to Mr.
Ducommun are (presumably) for work performed other than in May of 1993,
there are no funds in the hands of [the garnishee] against which Inland has a lien.

In re Ducommun, 159 B.R. at 920-21.

garnishee's disbursement of garnished funds to a third party in no way satisfies the debt owed to
the lienholder.
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: APPEAL - 10

This Court disagrees with the bankruptcy court's use of American Fruit Growers to
support termination of a lien on garnished wages. The Idaho Supreme Court stated the following
regarding the holding in American Fruit Growers:

Falk-Bloch Mercantile Co. v. Branstetter, 4 Idaho 661, 43 P. 571; American Fruit
Growers, Inc., v. Walmstad, 44 Idaho 786, 260 P. 168; and similar cases from
other jurisdictions ... hold in effect that in attaching personal property capable of
manual delivery, the officer must actually seize and hold the property to the
exclusion of others, in order to create and maintain the lien of attachment.
Jaquith v. Stanger, 79 Idaho 49, 54, 310 P.2d 805, 808 (1957) (emphasis added). American
Fruit Growers dealt exclusively with garnishment of personal property capable of manual
delivery-potato sacks in that case. Idaho Code § 8-506(3) states, "Personal property capable of
manual delivery must be attached by taking it into custody." An identical statute was in effect
when the Idaho Supreme Court rendered the American Fruit Growers decision.
In this case, MRS levied on the future earnings of Ms. Christ. When BCS served the
Writ, those future earnings were not capable of manual delivery and could not be attached by
taking them into custody. Thus, attachment occurred pursuant to Idaho Code§ 8-506(5). BCS
left the Writ with WSEC and gave notice that wages payable to Ms. Christ were attached
pursuant to the Writ. In other words, when a "continuing garnishment" is in effect, attachment is
a "continuing" process. As Ms. Christ earned wages, WSEC became obligated to pay her, and
MRS obtained a lien on that debt.
This Court agrees that attachment of "tangible property, susceptible of manual seizure
and delivery" depends on taking and maintaining possession of the property. In this case,
however, the lien attached to a debt not capable of manual delivery. Thus, the levying officer,
BCS, did not need to "take" possession of anything in order to create the lien. See I.C. § 8-

c· r.~
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506(5). It would make no sense to hold that BCS needed to "maintain" possession of anything in
order to preserve the lien.
This Court concludes MRS's lien did not terminate when WSEC erroneously sent the
checks to BBC. Thus, BBC, upon learning of MRS's interest in the disputed funds, had no right
to retain them. Whereas the facts are not in dispute, and the Magistrate's decision regarding
ownership should be reversed, this Court concludes summary judgment should be entered in
favor of MRS on the issue of conversion.
C. Constructive Trust

MRS asks this court to conclude that MRS holds equitable title to the disputed funds that
are in BBC's possession.
BBC responds stating, "Since MRS did not confer any benefit upon BBC, there can be no
unjust enrichment, and thus there can be no constructive trust."
A constructive trust is an obligation "created by law when money or property has been
placed in one person's possession, under such circumstance that in equity and good conscience,
he ought not to retain it." Warm Springs Properties, Inc. v. Andora Villa, Inc., 96 Idaho 270, 526
P.2d 1106 (1974). "Where a person receives a benefit from another he is liable to pay therefor if
the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that as between the two it is unjust for him
to retain it." Id "A constructive trust is a remedial device created primarily to prevent unjust
enrichment; equity compels the restoration to another of property to which the holder thereof is
not justly entitled .... A constructive trust may be imposed in practically any case where there
is a wrongful acquisition or detention of property to which another is entitled." Chinchurreta v.
Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 790 P.2d 372 (Ct. App. 1989).

r·
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Pursuant to this Court's prior holding regarding unjust enrichment and conversion, this
Court also concludes a constructive trust should be imposed on the disputed funds in favor of
MRS.
D. Motion to Amend Complaint

Having concluded that MRS should prevail on the issues of unjust enrichment,
conversion, and constructive trust, this Court will not address whether the Magistrate Court
abused its discretion in denying MRS's motion to amend its complaint.
E. Pre-Appeal Attorney's Fees

Having concluded MRS should prevail on the issues of unjust enrichment, conversion,
and constructive trust, BBC is not the prevailing party, and the Magistrate's order regarding
attorney's fees against MRS should be vacated. BBC should be ordered to return the money it
received pursuant to that ordeOr. As MRS is now the prevailing party, this case should be
remanded to the Magistrate for determination of a reasonable award for MRS' s pre-appeal
attorney's fees.
F. Attorney's Fees on Appeal

This Court concludes MRS is the prevailing party on appeal. Pursuant to Idaho Code §
12-120(1) and Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, MRS is entitled to a reasonable award for
attorney's fees on appeal.
V. CONCLUSION

This Court reverses the Magistrate's judgment in favor of BBC. The Magistrate's
conclusion regarding unjust enrichment is vacated and summary judgment is hereby entered in
favor of MRS on that issue. Consistent with that conclusion, this Court also imposes a
constructive trust in favor of MRS on the disputed funds currently held by BBC. As an
{
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alternative basis for this Court's conclusion, this Court holds that a MRS is entitled to summary
judgment on its claim for conversion. The Magistrate's conclusion regarding conversion is
vacated and summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of MRS on that issue.
This Court has not addressed and will disturb the Magistrate's conclusion regarding
MRS's motion to amend.
The Magistrate's order regarding attorney's fees against MRS is vacated, and BBC is
hereby ordered to return the money it received pursuant to that order. This Court remands the
case for determination of a reasonable, pre-appeal fee award in favor of MRS. Finally, this
Court holds MRS is entitled to a reasonable award for attorney's fees on appeal.

--

DATED this ( O day of October 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day of October 201 1, I did send a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by
causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Bryan D. Smith
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup A venue
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Todd R. Erikson
TODD R. ERIKSON, P.A.
3456 E. 17th St., Ste. 280
Idaho Falls, ID 83406

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho
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Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES,
PLLC,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS, INC.,
Defendant/Respondent.

)

Case No. CV 08-5817

)
)
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
)
)
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
)
)
)
)

Defendant/Respondent, Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., (BBC) moves
the court pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ll(a)(2)(B) for an order
reconsidering and reversing the Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal, dated October 6,
2011, which order reversed the Magistrate's judgment in favor of BBC and an award of
attorney fees, ordering BBC to return the attorney fees obtained from MRS, and entered
judgment against BBC for unjust enrichment, imposed a constructive trust, and for
conversion, and awarded attorney fees against BBC.
In support of its Motion for Reconsideration BBC provides the following brief:
1.

Undisputed Facts.

The court seems to have neglected the following undisputed facts in its decision:
On August 20, 2008, Clayne Bodily, BBC's manager, spoke with Western States
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Equipment Company (WSEC) which indicated that WSEC had mistakenly sent WSEC
checks to BBC, but that WSEC would now send the checks to the Bonneville County
Sheriff. Bodily asked if BBC could keep the WSEC checks it had already deposited and
applied to Christ's accounts with BBC, and if WSEC could just continue the Medical
Recovery Services (MRS) garnishment.

WSEC did not reply to BBC regarding this

request. Bodily was later informed by WSEC that they had been instructed by MRS's
attorney, Bryan D. Smith, not to speak with BBC.

WSEC never demanded BBC to

return the WSEC checks or disputed funds.
All of the WSEC checks had been deposited by BBC prior to the time that MRS
made written demand to BBC for the return of the $1,083.21 received by BBC from
WSEC.
There was a continuing garnishment of Christ's wages from at least July 2008
through at least April 2009 and Christ continued to be employed at WSEC during that
entire time. MRS discontinued the garnishment against Christ and, in fact, instructed
WSEC to stop payment on a check or to recall a check from the Bonneville County
Sheriff from WSEC which had continued to garnish the wages of Christ. WSEC was
obligated to continue the garnishment and was continuing the garnishment until ordered
to discontinue the garnishment by MRS. If MRS had continued its garnishment rather
than discontinuing its garnishment in order to pursue this litigation, then MRS would
have received the equivalent amount from WSEC that BBC received from WSEC by
October 2008 and this matter would be moot.
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2.

Real party in interest.

BBC is not the real party in interest. BBC raised this defense in its answer.
WSEC is the real party in interest. The checks delivered to BBC by WSEC were written
on WSEC's account to BBC. WSEC is the owner of the checks in question. It is
irrelevant whether WSEC owed any money to BBC. MRS has no rights in checks written
to BBC by WSEC on WSEC's own banking account. BBC negotiated the checks prior to
demand by MRS for the return of the disputed funds. WSEC never demanded the return
of the disputed funds from BBC.
MRS' s action is against WSEC as the garnishee which remains liable to MRS
until the garnishment is satisfied pursuant to Idaho statute. BBC has never had in its
possession any property of MRS.
3.

Garnishment Statues.

MRS's claims in this matter arise from Idaho's garnishment statutes. MRS's lien
on Christ's wages arise from the garnishment statutes. "[T]here is no need for a equitable
remedy when a legal remedy is available through the garnishment statutes." See Iron
Eagle Development, L.L.C. v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487 (2003). "The

remedy by attachment is entirely statutory, and the requirements of the statute must be
substantially followed; otherwise, the attaching creditor acquires no superior right or lien
upon the debtor's property." American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Walmstad, 44 Idaho 786,
792 (1927). Thus, no superior right or lien can be acquired ifthe statute is not followed.
It is clear that the Idaho garnishment statutes create the right to garnish and lien

wages. Although these statutes create the lien upon Christ's wages, this court did not
apply those statutes to the instant case.

This court simply disagreed with In re
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Ducommun, 159 B.R. 919 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 1993), by quoting from Jaquith v. Stanger,
79 Idaho 49 (1957), an action for damages for trespass to the personal property of
plaintiff, wherein the court stated, in dicta, that "in attaching personal property capable of
manual delivery, the officer must actually seize and hold the property to the exclusion of
others, in order to create and maintain the lien of attachment."
However, personal property is defined as "in a broad and general sense,
everything that is the subject of ownership, not coming under denomination of real
estate." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Hence, money is personal property.
Money is capable of manual delivery, i.e. mailing a check. WSEC was to seize and hold
the personal property to the exclusion of others and to forward it (normally by mailing a
check) to the sheriff in order to create and maintain the lien of attachment. However,
WSEC did not hold the personal property to the exclusion of others. WSEC did not
forward a check to the sheriff.

A lien was not maintained on checks forwarded to

someone other than to the sheriff.
When funds are no longer in the possession of the garnishee there is no lien
against those funds.

In re Ducommun, 159 B.R. at 921.

The lien is therefore a

possessory lien. "[T]he service of the writ of garnishment create[ s] a lien on the property
held in the hands of the garnishee." In re David & Laura Aughenbaugh, 2002 WL
33939738 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho). Idaho Code Section 8-506 provides that attachment occurs
by a writ for "the credits or other personal property in his possession or under his
control." Idaho Code Section 8-509(b) directs the garnishee to "pay to the sheriff' the
wages as they come due.
While MRS continued to have a lien in the future wages of Christ, it had no right

{
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or lien on a check written on a WSEC account to BBC, delivered to BBC, and negotiated
by BBC. The lien on Christ's future wages did not terminate because the garnishment
was a continuing garnishment.
Furthermore, money is fungible.

Money deposited into an account, a general

fund, loses its characteristics. There is no evidence that the only money in the WSEC
account was wages garnished by WSEC from Christ. Undoubtedly, it was commingled
with other funds.

Therefore, WSEC checks written to BBC came from a fungible,

commingled account.
The court stated that the future earnings of Chris were not capable of manual
delivery and could not be taken into custody. However, when those future earnings
became present earnings and were, in fact, paid, then they were capable of being
delivered to the sheriff. The funds were, therefore, capable of manual delivery to the
sheriff.

WSEC did not do this.

WSEC delivered checks to BBC.

Although the

garnishment lien is preserved during the continuing garnishment, WSEC still needed to
maintain possession of the funds collected in order to preserve the lien as to those funds.
Then WSEC had to delivery those funds to the sheriff just as it did when it delivered
checks to the sheriff which MRS subsequently refused to accept. If WSEC was no longer
in possession of the checks and the sheriff was not in possession of the checks, then there
is no possession, and, therefore there is no lien on those checks.
Hypothetically, if WSEC, instead of writing the checks to BBC, had mistakenly
written the same checks for the same amounts to Bonneville County Implement which
was owed money by WSEC, then would Bonneville County Implement have been liable
to MRS for a conversion, been unjustly enriched and a constructive trust have been
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constructed? Would Bonneville County Implement be ordered to return the disputed
funds to WSEC?

The answer would certainly be no.

Or, if the money owed to

Bonneville County Implement was disputed by WSEC, and WSEC had not intention of
paying any amount to Bonneville County Implement would that somehow make any
difference? Would Bonneville County Implement then have been liable to MRS for a
conversion, been unjustly enriched and a constructive trust have been constructed? It
would seem that WSEC would have a claim against Bonneville County Implement over
the disputed funds, and MRS would have no interest except as to WSEC.

In both

examples, as in this case, the simple fact is that WSEC issued checks to a third party,
WSEC did not maintain possession of the checks, and WSEC did not deliver the checks
to the sheriff. MRS can have no interest in a WSEC check written to any third party,
except the sheriff, and delivered to that third party.
The court also stated that MRS would be burdened by continuing the
garnishment. How can there be a burden to MRS to continue a continuing garnishment?
No further action at all is required by MRS to continue a continuing garnishment. By
statute the garnishment continues on its own until the judgment is satisfied.

4.

Unjust enrichment.

The court determined that because MRS had garnished Christ's wages that that
conferred a benefit upon BBC. However, the only benefit conferred upon BBC was the
benefit conferred by WSEC by sending WSEC checks to BBC. The court stated that
"BBC would not have received the funds absent MRS's efforts" and that "absent the writ
procured by MRS" the funds would have been sent to Christ instead. Nowhere is there a
claim by MRS that it directed WSEC to send WSEC checks to BBC.

{c
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Using the court's own logic one would have to reach the conclusion that the
medical provider who turned over the account to MRS also conferred a benefit upon
BBC: for if the medical provider had not turned over the account then MRS would not
have garnished Christ, and then WSEC would not have sent WSEC checks to BBC.
Using the court's own logic and taking it another step then one would also have to reach
the conclusion that Christ himself conferred a benefit upon BBC: for since Christ did not
pay the medical account it had to be turned over to MRS, who garnished Christ's
account, and then WSEC sent WSEC checks to BBC. It is simply illogical to conclude
that MRS conferred any benefit upon BBC. The only benefit conferred upon BBC was
by WSEC and no one else.
In the classic, law school, unjust enrichment example A contracts with B to paint
B's house, but instead A mistakenly paints C's house. A has conferred a benefit upon C,
i.e. A painted C's house. A is the only one who has conferred any benefit upon C.
D, who referred B to A, cannot claim that he has conferred a benefit upon C
because without the referral to B then C's house would have never been painted by A.
Nor can E, the paint supplier, claim he has conferred a benefit upon C because C's house
would not have been painted absent the paint provided by E to A.

Nor can F, the

mailman, who mistakenly told A that C's house was B's house claim that he conferred a
benefit upon C because without that mistake A would not have painted C's house. The
only one who conferred a benefit upon C is A: A painted C's house.
In this matter the only one who conferred any benefit upon BBC was WSEC:

WSEC wrote checks on WSEC's account to BBC.

(,.., clJ ')
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Additionally, it is not inequitable for BBC to have accepted the benefit from
WSEC as BBC had accounts for which Christ owed, and as WSEC did not make a
demand for the return of the disputed funds. It is not inequitable for BBC to retain
WSEC checks received from WSEC as MRS would have still received payment from
WSEC under the continuing garnishment which would have satisfied the judgment
against Christ. However, rather than accepting checks from the sheriff MRS voluntarily
discontinued the continuing garnishment which would have satisfied MRS's judgment
against Christ and instructed WSEC to stop payment on a check or recalled a check from
the Bonneville County Sheriff from WSEC which had continued to garnish the wages of
Christ. Furthermore, MRS has an adequate legal remedy against WSEC, the real party in
interest, pursuant to Idaho garnishment statutes. As BBC has not been unjustly emiched
by MRS, there can be no constructive trust.

5.

Conversion.

"A complaint which alleges that plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the
possession of property therein described and that defendant converted it to his own use,
and which states the value of the property, or alleges that plaintiff has been damaged in a
sum named, sufficiently states a cause of action for conversion, unless other averments
are required by statute." Williams v. Bone, 74 Idaho 185, 187-88 (1953).

First, as discussed above MRS is not the owner of a WSEC check written to BBC
nor entitled to possession of the WSEC check written to BBC. Second, MRS has not been
damaged. There was a continuing garnishment of Christ's wages from at least July 2008
through at least April 2009 and Christ continued to be employed at WSEC during that
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entire time. MRS discontinued the garnishment against Christ and, in fact, instructed
WSEC to stop payment on a check or to recall a check from the Bonneville County
Sheriff for which WSEC had continued to garnish the wages of Christ. WSEC was
obligated to continue the garnishment and was continuing the garnishment until
instructed by MRS to discontinue it. If MRS had continued its continuing garnishment
rather than discontinuing it in order to pursue this litigation, then MRS would have
received the equivalent amount that BBC received from WSEC by October 2008 and this
matter would be moot.

MRS would have suffered no damage because it would have

received within six weeks the amount MRS sought as damages in its complaint in the
amount of the three checks.
"[T]he duty to mitigate, also known as the "doctrine of avoidable consequences,"
provides that a plaintiff who is injured by actionable conduct of a Defendant is ordinarily
denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided by reasonable acts,
including reasonable expenditures, after actionable conduct has taken place. See

Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 261 (1993)." Peasley Transfer &
Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743 (1999).
MRS had a duty to mitigate its "damages" by continuing the garnishment against
Christ with WSEC. However, MRS chose to "discontinue" the garnishment and told
WSEC to stop payment on a check or to recall a check from the Bonneville County
Sheriff which would have gone toward the judgment obtained by MRS against Christ.
Additionally, MRS directed WSEC not to speak to BBC.
If MRS had continued the continuing garnishment, which would not have

involved any additional expenditure, work, or "burden" by MRS, then MRS's judgment
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would have been satisfied. BBC's retention of the checks written to it by WSEC would
have only prolonged MRS' s garnishment by three pay periods or approximately one and
one-half months.
One might wonder why MRS did not mitigate its "damages" by accepting the
next three garnishment checks from WSEC rather than stopping the garnishment. MRS
had the ability to make itself whole but failed to do so.

MRS has failed to mitigate its

damages. There simply is no conversion.
6.

Conclusion.
Based upon the foregoing this court should reverse its Memorandum Decision Re:

Appeal dated October 6, 2011, and affirm the Magistrates' repeated judgment in favor of
BBC and its award of attorney fees to BBC. And BBC should be entitled to its fees in
this matter on appeal.
DATED this 20th day of October, 2011.

Todd R. Erikson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon
the following this 20th day of October, 2011, by first class mail:
Bryan N. Zollinger
Bryan D. Smith
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
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Todd R. Erikson, #4 3 74
Todd R. Erikson, P.A.
3456 E. 1ih St., Ste. 280
Idaho Falls, ID 83406
Telephone: (208) 522-3305
Fax: (208)523-5840
Email: eriksonlaw@gmail.com

)

1

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES,
LLC, a limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS, INC., a corporation,
Defendant/Appellant.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 08-5817

NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC, ITS
ATTORNEYS, SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., appeals against

the above-named Respondent, Medical Recovery Services, LLC, to the Idaho Supreme Court from
the Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal (1) reversing the Magistrate's judgment in favor of
Appellant, (2) vacating the magistrate's conclusion regarding unjust enrichment and entering
summary judgment in favor of Respondent, (3) imposing a constructive trust in favor of Respondent
on the disputed funds held by Appellant, (4) granting Respondent summary judgment on its claim for
conversion, (5) vacating the magistrate's conclusion regarding conversion and entering summary
judgment in favor of Respondent, (6) vacating the magistrate's order regarding attorney's fees
against Respondent, (7) ordering Respondent to return the money it received pursuant to the

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

magistrate's order regarding the award of attorney fees to Appellant, (8) remanding the case for a
determination of a reasonable, pre-appeal fee award in favor of Respondent, and (9) awarding
Respondent a reasonable award of attorney's fees on appeal; entered in the above-entitled action on
October 6, 2011, Honorable District Judge Dane H. Watkins Jr..
2.

The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment or

order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l)
I.AR.

3.

Preliminarily, the issues on appeal are as follows:
A.

The decision and order was not consistent with applicable law nor supported by

substantial and competent evidence.
B.

Attorney fees and costs on this appeal.

C.

This list of issues shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on

appeal.
4.

An order has not been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested.

6.

Appellant requests the preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, and, in
addition, the following documents:
A.

Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, March 19, 2009.

B.

Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, March 19, 2009.

C.

Defendant's Brief Re: Summary Judgment, April 20, 2009

D.

Affidavit of Clayne Bodily, April 21, 2009.

E.

Response to First Request for Admission, April 21, 2009.

F.

Order Denying Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, June 4, 2009.

G.

Judgment, June 11, 2009.

H.

Appellate Brief, August 17, 2009.

I.

Defendant/Respondent's Brief, October 7, 2009.

J.

Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, April 8, 2010.

K.

Defendant/Respondent's Brief, May 12, 2010.
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L.

Order on Motion to Reconsider, June 29, 2010.

M. Order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, August 24, 2010.

7.

N.

Order on settlement of attorney fees and costs, November 17, 2010.

0.

Judgment, November 17, 2010.

P.

Brief filed in support of motion for reconsideration, January 13, 2011.

Q.

Order on Reconsideration, February 16, 2011.

R.

Order on Motion for reconsideration, April 29, 2011.

S.

Appellate Brief, July 11, 2011.

T.

Respondent's Brief, August 8, 2011.

U.

Reply Brief, August 29, 2011.

I certify:
A.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

B.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

C.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.

DATED this 17th day of November, 2011.

d@Todd R. Erikson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the
following this 1ih day of November, 2011, by first class mail:
Bryan D. Smith
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
Idaho State Bar# 4411
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq.
Idaho State Bar# 8008
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Avenue
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
(208) 524-0731
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-08-5817
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

BONNEVILLE BILLING AND COLLECTIONS,
INC, a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

THIS MATIER having come on regularly for hearing on defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge on November 17,
2011, with plaintiff appearing by and through Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll &
Associates, PLLC, and defendant appearing by and through Todd R. Erikson, Esq., of the firm
Todd R. Erikson, P.A.; and the Court having reviewed its files, considered oral arguments from
counsel, and otherwise being fully advised on the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
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F:\CLIENTS\BDS\8006\Pleadings\0051 Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration.doc

MADE AND ENTERED this

4

day of November, 2011.

District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this,~ay of November, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION to be
served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to
the following:
Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC
P. 0. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0731

Todd R. Erikson, Esq.
3456 East lih Street, Suite 280
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery

Fax
Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
Idaho State Bar# 4411
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq.
Idaho State Bar# 8008
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Avenue
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
{208) 524-0731
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-08-5817
Plaintiff,
vs.

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT
AND RECORD

BONNEVILLE BILLING AND COLLECTIONS,
INC, a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT, BONNEVILLE BILLING AND COLLECTIONS, INC., ITS
ATTORNEY, TODD R. ERICKSON, THE COURT REPORTER AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent, Medical Recovery Services, LLC., in the

above-entitled proceeding hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 19, l.A.R., the inclusion of the
following material in the reporter's transcript and the clerk's record in addition to that required
to be included by the l.A.R. and the Notice of Appeal. Any additional transcript is to be provided
in hard copy:

'

j..,

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - Page 1
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'"j".'

.,

~L

1.

Reporter's transcript:
A. Transcript of the Appellate Hearing held on November 7, 2011.

2.

Clerk's Record:
A. Affidavit of Bryan Zollinger and attached exhibits filed March 19, 2009.

3.

I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcript has been served on
each court reporter of whom a transcript or record is requested as named below
at the addresses set out below and that the estimated number of additional
pages being requested is 50.

4.

I further certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the
clerk of the district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
l.A.R. Rule

J°)_

~ovember, 2011.

DATED t h i s U

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

2.

~f

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
November, 2008, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD to be
served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to
the following:

[~ail

Todd R. Erikson, Esq.
3456 East 17th Street, Suite 280
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Overnight Delivery

Bryan D. Smith
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Todd R. Erikson, #4374
Todd R. Erikson, P.A.
3456 E. 17111 St., Ste. 280
Idaho Falls, ID 83406
Telephone: (208) 522-3305
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Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES,
PLLC, a limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

)

BONNEVILLE BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS, INC., a corporation,
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)
)

TO:

)

Case No. CV 08-5817

)
)

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD

THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, ITS ATTORNEY, AND THE CLERK OF THE

ABOVE ENTITLED COURT
Notice is given that Defendant requests pursuant to Rule 19, LA.R., the inclusion of the
following material in the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included in the I.AR. and
the Notice of Appeal.:
1. Motion for Reconsideration and Brief in Support of Motion filed October 20, 2011.
2. Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, dated November 22, 2011.
DATED this 26r11 day of January, 2012.

Todd R. Erikson
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P.1

JAN-26-2012 09: 09A FROM: ERIKSON LAl,J OFFICE

208-523-5840

P.2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that l served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the
111
following this 26 day of January, 2012, by courthouse box:
Bryan D. Smith
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

~-----
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MEDICAL RECOVER SERVICES,
LLC, a limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS, INC., a corporation,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2008-5817
Docket No. 39408-2011

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION
OF EXHIBITS

~~~~~~~~~~~)

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Bonneville

)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its detennination:
please see attached sheets (0 page).
NONE
And I further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court
this 2"d day of February, 2012.
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MEDICAL RECOVER SERVICES,
LLC, a limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS, INC., a corporation,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

Case No. CV-2008-5817
Docket No. 39408-2011

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete
Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be duly
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and
the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District Court this
2°d day of February, 2012.
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MEDICAL RECOVER SERVICES,
LLC, a limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
BONNEVILLE BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS, INC., a corporation,
Defendant/Appe Hant.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2008-5817
Docket No. 39408-2011

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

day of February, 2012, I served a copy of the Reporter's

Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled
cause upon the following attorneys:
Bryan D. Smith
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Todd R. Erikson
TODD R. ERIKSON, P.A.
3456 E. 1i 11 St., Ste. 280
Idaho Falls, ID 83406

by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me.

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

By:
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